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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this treatise may he stated, in general
terms, as an investigation of certain aspects of the social
philosophy of George Berkeley. The doctrines to be treated
admit a division into two general types: those growing out
of speculation not necessarily social in reference, but
bearing directly upon social phenomena, and those growing
out of a direct consideration of social phenomena. That such
a division is arbitrary and only one of degree is obvious;
but it seems necessitated by the subject matter, as will sub-
sequently be shown. The exposition will follow this division.
Two methods of criticism will be employed: internal criti-
cism, wherein the essential problem is. Does Berkeley’s
thought, both theoretical and practical, make a consistent
whole? and historical criticism, in which the adequacy of his
thought for the practical problems he faced will be discussed.
Briefly, then, the problem is: Does Berkeley have a social
philosophy? If so, what is it, and what is it worth?
A. Definition of Social Philosophy
The preceding statement demands an explanation of the
nature and scope of social philosophy. Philosophy is the
c.
:
,
,
:
.
-
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2persistent rational attempt to understand the whole of human
experience. Social philosophy refers to this enterprise in
its particular consideration of human individuals in their
relations with each other. The social philosopher seeks to
discover the general principles underlying social processes
and structures. In these principles he proposes to find a
concrete basis through which the social aspect of human ex-
perience may be understood and criticized, and by which a
reconstruction of society--or perhaps the construction of a
new society— in the interests of a more harmonious living may
be made possible.
The social philosopher finds the human individual among
others of his species, associating with them, expressing him-
self among them, contributing to them, and partaking of them
and their contributions. To this activity the term "social
process" refers. The principles sought are those which may
account for the relative harmony or disharmony of the process,
such as individualism, altruism, freedom, and justice. The
social process has countless aspects and takes a myriad forms.
A more intimate aspect is found in close relationships such
as those characterized by family life; a broader aspect may
be seen in the political organization of the social community,
or, in perhaps a more intangible form, in the formation of
culture groups. Movement, growth, and change are character-
istic of the social process.
*.
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3But also, more or less static characters are to be found
in this shifting scene. Social structures were mentioned above
as phenomena of interest to the social philosopher. At various
points the social process seems to leave a deposit, or to
crystallize, in specific forms of organization. These organ-
izations, or structures are at once an expression of and an
instrument for further expression of the social process. They
provide the means by which the social process is ordered and
advanced, but may also have a decided negative effect in
creating disorder and blocking progress. Ideally, there are
only three basic problems in social life, the problem of good,
the problem of freedom, and the problem of control. But be-
cause this is a human experience the problem is far more com-
plex. In primitive economic life the concept, property, ap-
peared and has been perpetuated; a legal and ethical structure
evolved to regulate and to protect it, certain agencies are
formed to carry out such regulation and protection. In a less
abstract sphere the industrial revolution resulted in modern
capitalistic economy and urbanized culture. Political organ-
ization is found in every division of society. A dominant
religious group may color the cultural life of a whole com-
munity. In other words, the social process goes on in defi-
nite channels— it becomes institutionalized . The term
"institution” may be used to indicate both the abstract con-
cept, such as property, and the actual agency which object-

4ifies it, the property-holder.
The areas of experience indicated by the institutions
mentioned above (and others—no attempt was made to be ex-
haustive), comprise the province of the social sciences. Here
the historian in general and the political scientist, the
economist, the sociologist, the student of law, the anthro-
pologist, the psychologist, the archaeologist, the philologist,
and the educator, in particular, have singled out fields of
investigation. Their findings furnish the social philosopher
much of his basic data. The social scientists gather infor-
mation as to what actually happens in the social process. They
provide detailed descriptions of the origin and development of
institutions and point out general laws based on orderly
sequence. The social philosopher takes the classified facts
then arrayed and the general statistical laws and seeks their
deeper significance in relation to the whole of experience.
Guided by scientific facts he inquires why the social process
takes certain forms, why institutions arise, whence their
authority derives, and whether they work coherently to a com-
mon and worthy end. In other words, he is interested in the
values and disvalues appearing in the social process, the in-
struments by which they appear, the authority of these instru-
ments, and of the causes which support the social process. He
seeks to explain social good and evil, to define the good in
society, and to understand by what principles society arrives
.-
•
'
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5at good, or otherwise. He must answer the question, is the
social process determined, or is it determinable?
Central to social philosophy is the human individual. His
relative position and importance may vary among different
thinkers. Prom one view he is but a cog in the social mechan-
ism and as such is wholly subservient to society. On the
other hand, some thinkers find the individual isolated in his
self-effected individuality and stress his uniqueness as a
self-sufficient unit. The former view emphasizes society and
forgets the individual; the latter makes the individual supreme
by ignoring society. Obviously a middle ground is more in
accord with the facts. Ho matter where the stress is laid,
one truth is apparent. Society consists of individuals. The
abstraction, society, is in itself meaningless until it is
made concrete with a garnishing of people. Social process
and structures may fade away as we approach and analyze them,
but the individual (though in some cases unfortunately) always
remains. In practice, obviously, and in theory, inevitably
though tacitly, we deal with individuals.
Hence in social philosophy any theory put forward is con-
cerned with this irreducible and ineradicable unit. A prin-
ciple has meaning only in so far as it refers to the indivi-
duals who with their relationship constitute the social process.
The institutions which give the process order and meaning are
individually conceived, their authority is based on personal
,>
—
.
t ,.
,
, t
.
4
allegiance, no matter how expressed; this authority is admin-
istered by individuals, and the meanings and values to which
institutions are as means to ends, are personal . Though
society be necessary for the achievement of values, their
selection and enjoyment is always a personal accomplishment.
Social philosophy is concerned with unique units and their re-
lations as they constitute a continuous process, with the di-
rections in which the process progresses and with the instru-
ments by which this progress if furthered.
B. The Legitimacy of the Study
It can hardly be said that Berkeley was a social phil-
osopher in the strict sense of being primarily interested in
the principles underlying social process and its structures.
In his writings no systematic and comprehensive study of social
problems is to be found; nor is there any systematic ethical
treatise extant. These shortcomings in systematic treatment
need not bar Berkeley from the social-philosophical universe
of discourse. The deep interest in moral, political, and
economic problems evinced in many of his works, as well as in
the course of his life, wholly warrant such a treatment as is
proposed here. Further, it is very probable that a religious
and moral motive was a determining factor in much of his more
theoretical philosophy. That this part of his work has im-
plications for all phases of human life is a truism; every

7"pract ical" philosophy deserving the name of philosophy has its
roots in metaphysics and epistemology, to say nothing of logic.
Berkeley's social philosophy is to he sought in three fields--
theoretical implications, the evidence of his life, and a large
body of writings concerning social subjects.
Berkeley’s primary philosophical interest is indicated by
the title of perhaps his most important work, the Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge . His epistemo-
logical interests led him to an idealistic metaphysics, a con-
clusion pregnant with meaning for the ends of social action.
The stress on mind and the conception of the self at which he
arrives, touches a basic aspect of social philosophy—the
status of the individual. Berkeley was from the beginning of
his philosophizing aware of the significance of his "Hew Prin-
ciple" for mundane affairs.^
-
He notes this himself in the
2
conclusion of the Principles
.
and in the Preface to the Dia-
3
logues Between Hylas and Phil onus
.
Berkeley's ethical writings are even more fruitful with
implications for the social scene. His moral views move from
a major emphasis on the relations of man to G-od in the Dis -
course on Passive Obedience to a more comprehensive insight
^ Johnston, CB, 45. The abbreviations and symbols used in the
footnotes are explained at the beginning of the bibliography.
^ Fraser, WGB, I, 345-6. With the exception of the Commonplace
„ Book the Fraser edition of Berkeley's text is used.3 Ibid., 375.

8into the relations of man and man in the Alciphron . The Com-
monplace Book abounds with references to moral problems and to
the proposed treatise on the subject, "The Two great principles
of Morality--the being of a God and the freedom of man, those
to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book."
4
Part IT
of the Brine iples
,
here alluded to, was partly written but was
5
apparently lost in Italy in 1715. Among the other sources
of Berkeley's ethics are the essays contributed to Richard
Steele's Guardian
,
scattered sections of the Siris
,
and numer-
ous sermons and letters.
Aside from these are found writings marking a direct in-
cursion into the sphere of social philosophy. Here should be
mentioned the Essay Toward Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain
,
the Discourse Addressed to Magistrates and Men in Authority
,
the Proposal for the Better Supplying of Churches in Our ?or -
eign Plantations
,
A Word to the Wise
,
and above all, the
Querist . In addition, significant comments are to be found
through his sermons.
Probably the most convincing evidence for considering
Berkeley as a social philosopher is his own life. Prom the
time of his return from Europe (1720) until his death there
were few times when he was not exhorting his countrymen on
behalf of some socially beneficial project. The Bermuda
4 Johnston, CB, 59.
5 WGB
,
I, 19.

9project alone occupied some eight years of his life. As
Bishop of Cloyne he urged his parishes to look after their
temporal as well as their eternal interests.
C. Plan of Exposition
The general plan of exposition is as follows: Chapter
Two is largely introductory and summary in character, survey-
ing Berkeley and his thought in their historical environment.
A summary of the political, economic, and cultural history of
a social philosopher’s time is particularly apropos. A treat-
ment of philosophical antecedents needs no defense. The social
and philosophical position occupied by Berkeley is indicated
in a sketch of his life, and the remainder of the chapter is
devoted to a summary of his philosophy.
Prom the point of departure thus provided. Chapter Three
is devoted to a discussion of Berkeley's conception of the
individual, his capacities and his obligations.
Chapter Pour is concerned with Berkeley's practical
social philosophy, in which his views on government, wealth,
and related subjects are brought to light.
In Chapter Five the critical problems mentioned at the
beginning will be resolved. Does Berkeley's philosophy, from
a social point of view, make a consistent whole? And, in
view of the problem he faced, can he be said to have been a
social idealist of comprehensive and adequate insight?
_.
.
.
.
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CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Historical Environment
Berkeley was born in 1685 and died in 1753. Roughly, his
life extends over the first half of the eighteenth century--
a century marked, on the whole, by consistent progress and
growth for Great Britain both at home and abroad,^ 1688 had
marked the end of the Stuart struggle to reassert royal pre-
rogative. By the Bill of Rights and the establishment of the
Protestant Succession the strength of the popular government
was confirmed, and the institution of ministerial government
began to show a significant aspect of English political or-
ganization. Throughout the reign of William and Mary, and
Anne, this new departure was solidified, and proved equal to
the test of the Jacobite revolts of 1689-92 and on the acces-
sion of George I in 1714 (though, of course, abetted by the
religious antipathy to the Pretenders). The lethargy and
incapability of the first of the Hanoverians paved the way to
further extension of cabinet power and the virtual rule of
England by Walpole from 1721 to 1742. By the close of the
1 Traill, SE, IV, 507-621; V, 1-365. Because of the general
nature of this historical material, no specific references
will be made.
* *
—
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Walpole regime the cabinet form of government was so firmly
established that, despite widespread resentment of the arro-
gant Whig oligarchy in the Commons and the systematic bribery
by which the ministry had been maintained, the only result
was a change of ministers.
The foreign scene during the period was far more turbulent
From 1689 to 1697 William T s interests in Holland and the tra-
ditional balance of power and ant i-France-and-Spain policies
maintained wars with Louis XIV. Again in 1702 these factors
brought England into the ’’War of the Spanish Succession.”
After this conflict was ended by the Peace of Utrecht in 1713,
a precarious peace was maintained by Walpole’s policy of
moderation; but in 1739 popular frenzy brought on the ’’War of
Jenkin’s Ear,” which led into the "War of the Austrian Suc-
cession,” ending in 1748. Besides these actually declared
wars, the friction between English, Spanish, and French colo-
nial interests supported a continual struggle in the colonies
in the form of Indian wars, and on the seas in the form of
legalized piracy.
The chief results of these wars were the extension of
English colonization and commerce and the contracting of a
large national debt. These are of great importance for the
economic history of the period. The Bank of England was es-
tablished in 1694 as a means of refinancing the public debt.
The enterprise was so successful, the attraction of remuner-
,i
12
ative investment loosening pursestrings which an out-moded tax
system was unable to molest, that a wave of stockjobbing en-
sued. The absorption of the debt by stock-companies proved so
profitable, and the expectations of profits from colonial and
commercial projects were so great that speculation ran riot.
The bubble burst with the failure of the South Sea Company in
1720 and a severe economic depression followed. TTo adumbra-
tions of the industrial revolution appear until after the
middle of the century. It was an era of slow growth in domes-
tic industry; small shops and the family were the typical com-
mercial units. Foreign trade expanded rapidly. Some progress
was made in agricultural practices. Berkeley’s Ireland is
characterized by continued poverty, made even more severe by
the famines of 1739-41.
In the more cultural history of the period the most sig-
nificant development is found in religious thought and discus-
sion. In literary circles the neo-classicist tradition was
perpetuated through Pope and Johnson, though Thomson's Winter
(1730), and Collin's Odes (1747), indicate that the weight of
an hypostatized past was being borne uneasily by more imagin-
ative spirits. In religious thought, on the contrary, con-
tinual turmoil and controversy is found. This arose from two
completely divergent quarters. On the one hand appeared the
rationalistic attack on religion--Beism and Free-thinking.
From the appearance of John Toland's Christianity not Ilyster -
-•*
f
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ious (1696) to William Tindal’s Christianity as Old as the
Creation (17E3), and on to the middle of the century conflict
waxed hot. The other attack on the established religion had
a more humble origin. Since the rift with Rome, England had
had an insistent though small increment of "enthusiast " re-
ligious sects. By the grace of temporally more auspicious
factors Puritanism had engulfed the country in the seventeenth
century. The restoration of the monarchy brought the Estab-
lished Church again into its own legally, but new sporadic
groups of the enthusiast type continued to appear, some to
persist. The Methodist society was founded at Oxford in 1730.
Churchmen fought a war on two fronts. In Ireland the Catholic
populace presented a third. The most significant for this
study is, of course, the rationalistic debate.
B. Berkeley’s Life
George Berkeley was born March 12, 1685, in Ireland, of
2
English parents. He entered Kilkenney School in 1696 and
seems to have been intellectually acute from an early age.
He records in his Commonplace Book : "that I was distrustful
at 8 years old; and consequently by nature disposed for these
2 A mystery surrounds Berkeley’s immediate family. Hone and
Rossi think his mother may have been a Catholic, thereby
accounting for his silence in regard to his parents, and
his leniency toward the "Papists.” Hone and Rossi, BB,
255-6.
.
14
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new doctrines. ” He entered Trinity College, Dublin, in 1700,
and made quite a brilliant record. He received the bachelor’s
degree in 1704, the master’s degree in 1707, and remained as
a lecturer until 1724, though after 1712 his connection with
4
the college was only nominal.
The period immediately following 1704 is one of great in-
tellectual activity for Berkeley. He led in the formation of
a society for philosophical discussion. His private diary,
or Commonplace Book
,
attests his interests, and indicates the
5
course of his development. This activity bore immediate
fruit in two mathematical studies, the Arithmet ica and the
Miscellanea Mathematics (both in 1707), which he published
anonymously. In 1709 the essence of the ’’New Principle" ap-
peared in his New The o ry of Vision . He had begun composition
of the Principles in 1708, though it was not published until
1710. In 1709 the Percival correspondence begins, which af-
fords intimate detail on both Berkeley’s intellectual and pub-
lic life. His friendship with this studious young nobleman,
afterwards an important figure in English public affairs, in-
dicates a close relationship with the practical world about him.
Johnston, CB, 30. The "new" doctrines are those of locke
an d Maie b ranch e
.
4 Berkeley’s family connections were broken at a very early
age. He never visited them after entering Trinity. They
are never mentioned, save in connection with attempts of
certain relatives to capitalize on his fame. Cf. Hone and
Rossi, BB, 8-9.
& Controversy still rages over both the order and content of
CB.
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Berkeley was ordained as a deacon of the Church of England
in 1709, and from this time forward his inclination to avoid
arguments which brought church doctrines into question becomes
a positive stand against anti-clerical arguments. The Dis -
course on Passive Obedience (1712), outlines his position to-
ward church and state in no uncertain tones. In fact, the
rigorous doctrine of obedience to the established powers which
he propounds seemed too zealous, and he fell under suspicion
of being a Jacobite. This greatly impeded his later efforts
to gain preferment in the Church.
In 1713 he traveled to England in search of health and
intellectual and ecclesiastical fortune. He gained an entry
to London literary circles through his friend Dean Swift, and
was soon much at home in intellectual circles. Both personally
and as a thinker he was greatly admired. Pope ascribed to
him "every virtue under Heaven," and Addison asked him to con-
tribute to his short-lived Guardian . The popularized exposi-
tion of the "TTew Principle"—the Dialogues between Hylas and
Philonus—appeared and added to his fame, since the Principles
had not been well received.
In 1713 Swift got him an appointment as chaplain to an
embassy to Sicily, and he went abroad. Most of the period
until 1721 he spent traveling on the continent, after 1716 as
tutor to the son of the Bishop of Clogher. His Journal for
these years indicates a wide range of interests in folk-lore,
(-
,
.
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geography, and climate, hut with little interest in political
6
matters. He seems particularly interested in agricultural
7
practice and products.
Berkeley found a sorry England upon his return in 1721.
The collapse of the South Sea Company the year before had
brought on a severe economic depression which was accompanied
by deep pessimism in all parts of the country. He responded
to this with the Essay Towards Preventing the Ruin of Great
Britain
,
declaiming against speculation and indolence, and
urging a return to religion, industry, frugality, and patriot-
ism.
Meanwhile he had been attempting to gain a position in
the Church. Jacobite imputations had overruled the efforts of
Q
Percival and the Prince of Wales to secure him the living of
St. Paul T s, Dublin, in 1716. Efforts to get the Deanery of
Dromore in 1722 met the same opposition from suspicious Whigs
and the same ill success. But the same year the amorous dif-
ficulties of his friend Dean Swift brought him a stroke of
good fortune. Swift T s "Vanessa" (Esther Van Homrigh ), piqued
at being supplanted by "Stella” left Berkeley the legacy Swift
had expected. After much litigation he profited handsomely
£
He does note the framework of the government of Naples.
WGB, IV, 293 ff.
7 Ibid., 260, passim .
8 His philosophically-minded consort, Caroline, had found
Berkeley very agreeable.
,<
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by it
.
Far more important for social philosophy is the appearance
in Berkeley’s correspondence with Percival of an idea which was
q
growing into the famous Bermuda project. This dominated his
life for the next eight years. In 1724 he finally received
the Beanery of Berry, but his sentiment on receiving it was
merely gratitude that his position as an apostle of Christian-
ity and education in the Hew World was enhanced, and conse-
quently the success of his endeavors made more probable.'1' 0
He went to England and soon London was buzzing with talk of a
college for Indians to be founded in the Bermudas for the
purpose of training native missionaries and teachers. His zeal
brought in voluntary contributions from all sides— even from
Walpole. He gained the ear of the King and a royal charter
was granted in 1725. The following year a bill setting aside
funds for the project passed the Commons with only two dissent-
ing votes. It must be recognized that there were other factors
than Berkeley’s persuasiveness and a wave of missionary fervor
in this apparent success. An institution for spreading the
Anglican gospel would provide a needed counterpoise to Jesuit
missionary success; the Spanish example proved that religion
was an invaluable tool in colonial and commercial expansion.
9 Hand, BP, 217-20, March 4, 1723. Berkeley says he had been
considering it for about ten months then.
10 WGB
,
IV, 344.
,.
•
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Berkeley himself notes the progress of Spain and the threat
of "an utter extirpation of our colonies, on the safety whereof
depends so much of the nation's wealth."
The success which at first seemed certain was not forth-
coming. Berkeley's royal warrant for the payment of the grant
was ignored in 1726. Opposition based on a fear that such an
institution would make the colonies less dependent on England
became widespread. After two fruitless years Berkeley decided
to go to America and attempt to develop the project there, un-
til the negotiations were completed.
He did not go to Bermuda, since to have done so would have
voided his Deanery within a year. He settled near Newport,
Bhode Island, bought a farm, and awaited news of his grant.
The colonists greeted him with much acclaim, and he spent two
quiet years with his newly married wife, preaching, and finding
congenial philosophical company in Samual Johnson, later the
founder of King's College (Columbia University). Enforced
idleness and the stimulation of Johnson led Berkeley back to
actual philosophical speculation. This resulted in the
Ale iphron
,
the first philosophical work published by him since
Hylas and Phil onus (1713), except for De Motu, an essay on
the scientific problem of motion, written in 1720.
A minor crusade made by Berkeley while in America has been
11 WGB, IV, 356.
..
'
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overshadowed by the Bermuda project. As was the custom, he
kept slaves. But he did not conform completely as is shown by
the fact that three of his negroes were admitted to Trinity
12Church, Newport, June 11, 1731. Heretofore, the policy of
the Church had been to deny the comforts of baptism to slaves.
Berkeley opposed this and sought an opinion on the matter from
the King's Attorney. The legal opinion coincided with Berk-
eley's, and he saw to having it published throughout the
13
colonies. He held that the gospel should be preached to all,
but also he held that slavery was consistent with the New
14Testament
.
By 1731 it was evident that the Bermuda grant would not
be paid. The practical fear that the colonies' dependency on
England would be lessened, coupled with resentment against
Berkeley's receiving the material benefit of his deanery,
though abroad for over two years, definitely closed the inci-
dent. Walpole assured Berkeley's friends that the grant would
not be paid. The Bishop of Down wrote, calling him home, and
15
recommending the church Papists to his conscience.
Disillusioned, and rather embittered against the free-
thinkers whom he felt were largely responsible for the failure
of his project, Berkeley returned to England. He writes to
12 Rand, BAS, 39.
13 WGB, IV, 404.
14 Ibid., 381.
lfc> Hone and Rossi, BB, 163.
-,
.
.
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Percival
:
What they foolishly call free-thinking seems to me
the principal root or source not only of opposition
to our college hut of most other evils in this age,
and as long as that frenzy subsists and spreads, it
is in vain to hope for any good, either to the
mother country or colonies, which always follow
the fashions of old England. 16
This attitude, coupled with the Alciphron
.
a systematic attack
upon free-thinking, is the clue to the following few years of
his life. He set himself up as the defender of the Church
against its foes—the deists within, and the free-thinkers
without. The Theory of Vision
,
or Visual Language
.
Vindicated
(1733) was directed primarily against deism. In the Analyst
(1735) he attacks free thinkers, though primarily the mathe-
maticians
,
point ing out the element of faith on which the
arbitrary assumption of mathematics and physics must be based.
Meanwhile events were transpiring which were to take him
from the scene of controversy. In 1734 he was rewarded with
the See of Cloyne in the south of Ireland. He retired thither
the following year and lived henceforth a quieter existence.
His interests turned to practical affairs. The backwardness
of Irish agriculture and industry amazed him and inspired the
Que rist (1735, new editions in 1736, 1737). He called evil
officials to task in the Discourse to Magistrates Occasioned
by the Enormous Licence and Irreligion of the Times (1736).
16 Rand, BP, 273.
: .
,
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As a Bishop he was entitled to a seat in Irish House of Lords,
hut seems to have been in attendance only once. In 1757 he
attended the trial of Peter Lens, the leader of a blasphemous
club.-*'’7 He did not address the House, and his suggestion that
1
8
the sumptuary laws be revived gained no support.
Two factors weigh heavily in the next few years of Berk
eley T s life—a widespread famine in Ireland from 1758-41, and
much reading in Greek philosophy, especially Plotinus. The
former led him to medicinal speculation; the latter, to the
final stage of his philosophy; the two are combined in the
S iris (1744). This book, extolling the virtues of tar-water
as a cure for all ills, was his greatest popular success. All
England drank tar-water for a time. The triumph was far more
19
medical than philosophical. Berkeley propagated his panacea
with ardor and was soon engaged in controversy--this time with
the doctors.
He continued living quietly at Gloyne, extending kindly
admonishings to the Catholics of his see, and maintaining in
his home a strong cultural influence upon his parishioners un-
til 1752. In ill health he returned to England, living with
his son at Oxford until his death January 14, 1755.
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from a survey of
17 Cf. WGB, IV, 502.
18 Hone and Rossi, BB, 206.
19 ibid., 256.

22
Berkeley’s life is that he was, emphatically, not a "closet”
philosopher. He traveled widely and was a familiar figure in
the political and social activity of his time. The Church was
always a central interest, both in thought and practice. He
was a man of great personal charm; no one could say anything
against him as a man, no matter how perturbing his philosophy
may have been. A central trait in his character seems to have
been a touch of crusading zeal. His whole life is colored by
a series of highly idealistic enterprises. Whether or not he
was a humanitarian and a visionary at the expense of reason
it is the business of this study to determine.
C. The Influences on Berkeley’s Philosophy
The independency of Berkeley is a matter of question.
Campbell Fraser, who may with safety be pointed out as the
first scholar to make a comprehensive and fruitful investigation
of his work, considered him highly original in his thought.
Later research has indicated his judgment, rT It does not seem
20
that his scholarship or philosophical learning was extensive,”
to be unjustified. The large number of references to various
writers, chiefly Locke, which appear in the Commonplace Book
,
belie such a statement. Wild notes the originality of this
document but also remarks that ’’the sense in which Berkeley’s
20 WGB, I, 4
«.
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early thought developed in and through a close study of pre-
21
ceding authors is made manifest on almost every page." To
point out that Berkeley leans upon his predecessors does not
deny his originality. Genuine philosophical originality does
not consist in breaking away from and ignoring the past; rather
does it consist in making creative use of the philosophical
heritage. That Berkeley accomplished the latter cannot be
denied.
Further controversy lurks in the problem of upon which one
of his predecessors Berkeley was most dependent. It is tra-
ditional to consider him as a link between Locke and Hume, and
a strong case may be built for attributing his paternity to
Locke. Fraser‘S and Johnston agree with this interpretation.
On the other hand. Luce would take a more "balanced" view.
To neglect the Lockian element in Berkeley would be
to fly in the face of the facts, and I have no wish
to go from one extreme to another. The balanced
view would be that both Malebranche and Locke ex-
erted a potent influence upon the young Irishman
in his plastic days, and that the two influences
were so heterogeneous that a comparison of weight
and value is futile. 24
Wild chooses to view Locke as his point of departure and Plato
25
as his guiding star. Further, Eantonen finds Descartes a
p £
wide and varied influence on Berkeley.
21
22
23
24
25
26
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The problems of how independent or dependent Berkeley was
as a philosopher, and which influence, if any, can be said to
he primary is of no immediate importance here. Luce's view
that the influences upon him were heterogeneous and extensive
is acceptable. The essential point of this discussion is just
what influences are to be found. What problems or theories
bequeathed by the past are important in Berkeley's thought?
(1) The Church . nBerkeley was first and foremost a
Churchman
.
na ' This statement as it stands is largely true,
though its author implies by it unjustly that Berkeley's re-
lations with the Church warped his allegiance to philosophic
truth. Religious motivations do not detract from the sincerity
of a man's philosophy. Luce says that Berkeley
Began and continued to philosophize primarily to
defend four fundamental religious convictions,
namely, that a God certainly exists, that he is
pure spirit, that he associates himself provi-
dentially with mankind, and that the human soul
is immortal. 28
The avowed enemies of religion and the propagators of theories
he considered antithetical to religious truths were his life-
long foes. A glance at the titles of his works conclusively
establishes this.
(2) Locke : It is very evident that Locke was more in-
27 Hone and Rossi, BB, 169.
28 Luce, Art. I, 278.
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fluent ial than any other philosopher in Berkeley T s early devel-
opment, if the number of references constitute a criterion.
His acquaintance with Locke’s thought dates probably from the
29time of his matriculation at Trinity College, and the Com-
monplace Book attests his absorption with it.
The most apparent connection between Locke and Berkeley
is the use of the empirico-psychological method. Berkeley
continues Locke’s analysis of the human understanding. He
accepts the Lockean conception of ideas, that they are either
sense impressions or perceptions constructed from these ira-
pressions with the aid of memory and imagination.'"
Undoubtedly Berkeley’s New Principle would never have been
born had it not been for Locke's distinction between primary
and secondary qualities. Bor Berkeley the idea of abstract
qualities such as extension inhering in a material substance
led directly to a materialistic metaphysics. The denial of
this distinction between qualities and the causal efficiency
of matter is Berkeley's chief advance over his fellow-country-
man.
Wild finds that the "spiritism" which Berkeley substi-
tuted for Locke's material causal agency is also found in
31Locke. That material substance remains in Locke rather a
29 Of. Luce, BAM, 6. Luce notes that Locke’s 3ssay was on the
course at Trinity within two years of its publication. (1690
)
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vague concept cannot be denied, and he does find active power
most clearly recognizable in the idea of spirit. Wild main-
tains that the most significant aspect of Berkeley is not this
subjective ’’spirit ism, ,T as it appeared in his early works, but
in the development of a more concrete logic. This, Wild af-
firms, was suggested to Berkeley by Locke's distinction between
"mental" and "verbal" propositions, and between "real" and
32
"trifling" knowledge.' Whether or not this be accepted, it
is apparent that Berkeley was repelled by Locke’s verbalism,
and that he remains a foe to abstraction throughout his works.
The conclusion that Berkeley found much of his epistemolo^
and at least some of his metaphysics in Locke seems warranted.
Especially interesting for this study is the fact that he seems
to have got nothing at all from Locke's Treatise on Civil
government
,
which is as significant a document in political
theory as the Essay on Human Understanding is for epistemology.
Not one reference to the Treatise is found in the Commonplace
Book . That he was familiar with Locke's theories on govern-
ment is apparent from Passive Obedience, but whatever influ-
ence may be found here is purely negative. He attacks Locke's
theory that government is based on the free consent of the
governed, established in a contract which is voided when the
public good is violated.' For Berkeley government is based
32 Wild, GB, 53 ff.
33 WGB, IV, 115 ff. Cf. Locke, TCG, 240 ff.
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on necessity and obligation, not consent; it has its origin
in the divine law of nature and is not merely a human insti-
34tution. Locke says that men should have the "common privi-
lege of opposing force with force,—self-defense is a part of
the law of Nature." 38 Berkeley recognizes that self-preserva-
tion is a natural law. But the rule, "Thou shalt not resist
the supreme power," is also a natural law, and "no negative
precept ought to be transgressed for the sake of observing a
36
positive one." Hence, it is apparent that wherever Berkeley
received inspiration for the social scene, or at least for
political affairs, it was not from Locke.
(3) The Cartesians : In the Commonplace Book many refer-
ences are found to Descartes and his followers, primarily to
Malebranche. He was conversant with the writings of both of
these chief figures of the rational-idealistic school. Here
above all should be noted the Cartesian emphasis upon the self,
3 7
a concept which came to dominate Berkeley's thought. Like-
wise, in attributing to God all movement in the universe, he
borrows a fundamental Cartesian tenet, though it must be recog-
nized that Berkeley's God was immanent, while for the Carte-
38
sians he was transcendent . Malebranche ' s tendency toward
WGB
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immaterial ism may have guided Berkeley in his discovery of
39
subjective idealism. His interest in mathematics led him
into the wider reaches of Cartesian speculation, but this need
not be considered further than his discovery of the faith ele-
40
ment in mathematics as put forth in the Analyst. In episte-
mology he remains antithetical to the Cartesian theory of con-
ceptual knowing, holding with Locke, that knowledge is per-
ceptual .
Other influences might be traced with ease. Newton’s
physical universe with its deistie implication was a permanent
object of attack. He was familiar with Hobbes and revolted
against his materialism. Numerous references to Hobbes are
found in the Commonplace Book . Berkeley speaks of the "hor-
rible consequence” of Hobbes distinction between existence
41
and perception, and calls him an enemy of religion. In
assailing the contract theory in Passive Obedience
,
he was
of course arguing against Hobbes’ classical formulation of
the theory. However, Berkeley uses almost the same argument
and arrives at a conclusion practically identical with Hobbes
42in his theory of absolute non-resistance. In basing his
ethical theory on self-interest he comes dangerously near to
Hobbes selfish theory of morals. The effect of Platonic and
Luce, BAM, 57, et passim.
WGB
,
III, 59-60.
41 Johnston, CB, 98; 100.
42 Wild, GB
,
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neo-Platonic philosophy must be recognized. The Siris indi-
cates a close affinity with much of this thought.
29
h. Berkeley’s Philosophy
It is impossible to give anything like a complete survey
of Berkeley's thought within the limits of this treatise. Yet
it is necessary that the general trend of his thought and the
major conclusions he reached be clearly in mind if his social
significance is to be rightly understood. An adequate summary
is made extremely difficult by the fact that his philosophy
is not expressed in one extensive and systematic work. His
philosophy is not an organic whole; in justice to him it can
only be understood as a development, and a not too continuous
development at that.
Obviously the first thing to be noted in Berkeley’s phil-
osophy is his ”!!ew Princ iple"--esse is percipi--i.e . the being
of things consists in their being perceived. Analysis of
conscious experience revealed to him that any reference to
anything was impossible without the existence of a mind. He
attacked Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary
qualities, showing that both types are only ideas existing in
44
mind. Further, and of primary importance, he finds that no
idea of a pure, abstract, extended, material substance is
WGB, I, 259
Ibid., 262.
.-
’
30
possible save when sensory qualities are attributed to it,
that such a substance conceived as existing objectively is a
contradiction in terms, since the sensory qualities allegedly
inherent in it can exist only in a mind. Hence material sub-
A C
stance cannot exist.
Hence all existing things are of the nature of thought.
Berkeley finds in his conscious experience, in addition to
ideas, an active, thinking being which operates with ideas,
46
and which acts. In reference to such a being is esse percipi .
But the existence of nature must certainly continue even though
all human minds are unconscious of it for a time. The human
self continues to exist. To explain this Berkeley points to
spirit as the only active principle known. All things must
arise from or be associated with spirit, i.e. God. T, It is
evident that the being of a Spirit—infinitely wise, good and
powerful— is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appear-
47
ances of nature.” All things, then exist in God’s mind.
Berkeley does not mean to deny the reality of perceptions,
or in any way to discredit the evidence of the senses.
Ideas imprinted on the senses are re al things, or
do really exist: this we do not deny; but we
deny they can subsist without the minds which
perceive them, or that they are resemblances
of any archetypes existing without the mind; 48
45 WGB, I, 861
•
46 Ibid., 858.
47 WGB, I, 897.
48 Ibid., 308.
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Berkeley uses "idea” to signify sense objects rather than
"thing" in order to make emphatic their necessary relation to
mind. Further, "thing" can refer to "thinking things" or
4-9
"spirits" whose existence cannot be denied.
This brings up a basic problem in Berkeley's philosophy.
Existence is perc ipi
.
but it is also percipere . Thinking
things must exist before anything else can have existence.
How is their existence known? Hot by ideas, for ideas are
sensory perceptions and purely passive, but by notions is the
thinker assured of the reality of himself, or soul, as an
50
active, understanding being. The self is passive in knowing
but active in willing. The problem of how this can be is
never completely explained by Berkeley. In the Principle
knowledge arises "not by discovering our necessary connexion
between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled
51laws of nature." But still man acts and knows that he is
accountable for his actions. For ethical reasons Berkeley
must maintain human freedom.
Central to the later stages of Berkeley's thought is this
problem of the passive and active self. The empirical logic
of the Princ iples and Hylas and Philonus admits no solution.
But Berkeley moves to a more rationalistic and concrete logic
WG®
,
I, 278.
bU Ibid., 272.
51 Ibid., 274.
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in the Alciphron and in the Siris . A careful study of these
works reveals this, and all the critics and commentators on
Berkeley, however varied their judgments of him may he, agree
52that his philosophy develops in this direction.
The mystic atmosphere of the Siris may belie this. The
emphasis he places on intuitions of the divine are certainly
far from concrete. On the other hand, his epitome of the
philosophica vita which concludes the work, may be taken as
representing his own attitude and development.
Truth is the cry of all, but the game of a few.
Certainly, where it is the chief passion, it doth
not give way to vulgar cares and views; nor is it
contented with a little ardor in the early time
of life; active, perhaps, to pursue, but not so
fit to weigh and. revise. He that would make a
real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age
as well as youth, the later growth as well as
first fruits, at the altar of Truth. 4
Hickes, BER, 209-11; Johnston, DBP, 9-11; Hone and Rossi,
_
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CHAPTER III
THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS STATUS
as has been said, society is made up of unique units
—
human individuals. Before any aiffirmation about social re-
lations, institutions, or processes can be made, it must be
made clear just what is related, controlled, or moved. What
is the nature of the individual? What can he do, and how?
What should he be and do? These are questions which must be
answered.
A. The Nature of the Individual
(1) Definition of "Persons' 1 : It is apparent from the
summary of Berkeley's philosophy that the being which has, or
rather, .is a mind is for him of the utmost importance. Early
in his philosophical development appears the statement:
Nothing properly but persons, i.e. conscious things
exist. All other things are not so much existences
but manners of ye existence of persons.
This declaration gives rise to a problem of major proportions,
however, when the following entry is noted:
The concrete of the will and understanding I must
call mind; not person, lest offence be given,
there being but one volition acknowledged to be
God. Mem.— Carefully to omit defining of
1 Johnston, CB, 3-4.
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Persons, or making much mention of it.
2
Prom these quotations it may he inferred that Berkeley
3proposed an unmistakably personalistic metaphysics. By mind
he means apparently the same thing as person. At any rate,
the "concrete of the will and the understanding" are certainly
human possessions. Hence, human beings, insofar as they will
and understand are basic metaphysical existents. The "con-
crete" referred to is designated variously by Berkeley as
spirit, soul, mind, or self.
The self includes both the will and the understanding, but
it is neither a volition nor an idea. By the word spirit he
4
means "all that is active." Though he vacillates on this
5
problem, Berkeley quite definitely rejects the separation of
the will and the understanding.
It seems to me that will and understanding--
volitions and ideas—cannot be severed, that-
either cannot possibly be without the other.
And again, "While I exist or have any idea I am eternally,
constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is
7
willing." Hence the spirit or self is something active, which
acts in certain ways. Its acts or functions are willing and
understanding, and these faculties are inseparable both in
2 Johnston, CB, 87.
3 Cf. Brightman, Art. I, 130.
^ Johnston, CB, 104.
5 Ibid., 101. "The Will is purus actus."
g Ibid., 103.
' Ibid., 97.
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themselves—from particular understandings and volitions—and
from each other. The complete statement appears in the Prin-
ciples .
A Spirit is a simple, undivided, active being—as
it perceives ideas it is called the understanding
,
and as it produces or otherwise operates about
them it is called the will . 8
The self is, then, above all active and unitary. Its
unity derives chiefly from its volitional character of which
the thinker is aware. In the Siris Berkeley again discusses
the self, though at this final stage in his thought the ac-
count given is Platonic, and far from the empirical discussions
of his early work. He finds in the mind
There is an instinct or tendency of the mind up-
wards, which sheweth a natural tendency to re-
cover and raise ourselves from our present
sensual and low condition, into a state of light,
order, and purity.
9
He adapts gladly the Platonic doctrine of existence as unity
to his empirical assurance of the reality of selves. ,TUpon
mature reflexion, the person or mind of all created beings
seemeth alone indivisible and to partake most of unity.
Accordingly, selves, or human individuals, are the most real
things in the temporal universe.
Concerning this conception of the individual as a most
real, active, understanding, and inspired being three things
8 WGB, I, 272.
9 WGB, III, 269.
10 Ibid., 290.
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may be said. First, obviously, the individual as a thinking
spirit, is.. Second, Berkeley fails to show concretely what
the individual is, hence does not show how he can be what he
is, which leads to the third criticism. The failure to show
what the individual is and how he can act and understand lies
in a distinction made by Berkeley not readily apparent from
the foregoing exposition. The mind is active in willing but
passive in understanding. Esse is percipi
,
but also esse is
perc ipere . Ideas are purely passive, but the mind is also
active. How can these active and passive elements exist in a
unitary being? Berkeley was on the verge of a solution of
this problem when he noted that ideas and volitions are in-
separable and that he was "constantly, eternally willing."
But his affinity for the Lockean conception of ideas and his
own theory of active spirit kept him from a realization of the
actual "concrete" and rationally willing self.
(2) Knowledge of the Self : This problem is intimately
connected with the foregoing discussion. If the self is, how
is it known? How is its "is-ness” known? This problem gave
Berkeley no little trouble. Early, he concludes that the very
existence of ideas constitutes the Soul—"Consciousness, per-
ception, existence of ideas seem to be all one."'1''1" But he
proceeds with the analysis and concludes, as Hume did later.
11 Johnston, CB, 69
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that "mind is hut a congeries of perceptions. Take away the
perceptions and you take the mind. Put the perceptions and
12you put the mind."
But Berkeley does not stop here. Common sense and the
fate of his entire system drive him to the contrary conclusion.
The existence of active spirit and the self must he upheld.
In Hylas and Phil onus
,
Hylas says that there can he no more
meaning to spiritual substance than there is to material sub-
stance. Phil onus replies,
I know or am conscious of my own being;— I my-
self am not my ideas hut somewhat else, a
thinking, active principle that perceives,
knows, wills, and operates about my ideas. 13
A knowledge of the self in the sense of having ideas of it is
impossible. But by reflection and introspection, a notion or
intuition of its unifying activity is gained. 14 Its reality
is undeniable, but Berkeley fails to give any rational reason
why. His empirical logic made the self untouchable; his only
resort was the basic Cartesian tenet, Cogito
,
ergo sum
,
though
1 5he would substitute volo for cogito .
(3) Freedom of the Self : The individual is an active,
thinking being. He is the necessary presupposition to all
action and knowing, though Berkeley fails to show exactly why
12 Johnston, CB, 69-70.
13 WGffi, I, 450.
14 Ibid., 307; Cf. Johnston, CB, 68.
13 Hone and Rossi, BB, 216-7.
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he is. But is man, as presupposed, free to act? And if so,
how? The metaphysics of the Princ iples leaves little room for
human freedom. Nothing can be more evident, he says,
Than the existence of God, or a spirit who is in-
timately present to our minds, producing in them
all that variety of ideas or sensations which
continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute
and entire dependence, in short, in whom we live,
and move, and have our being.
^
That an individual existing so intimately within the divine
Mind should be free in any way seems impossible. However, for
ethical reasons, man must be free and accountable for his ac-
tions. In the Princ iples Berkeley avoids imputing all the evil
in the world to G od by the Spinozistic expedient of noting
the narrowness of the finite mind, 7/hen viewed sub s pecie
1
7
aeterni what appears evil to man must be wholly good.
In Hylas and Phil onus he points out how freedom is pos-
sible. Hylas holds that if God is the immediate cause of all
motions, he must be the source of all immorality. Philonus
replies that for him God is immediate cause of only physical
actions hence not responsible for moral evil which consists in
the deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion.
There are no other agents in the world but spirits,
But this is very consistent with allowing to
thinking, rational beings, in the production
of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimate-
ly indeed derived from God, but immediately
16 WGB, I, 342
17 Ibid., 345.

39
under the direction of their own wills, which
is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt
of their actions. 18
Two things may he said in connection with these quotations.
First, Berkeley has shown that freedom is necessary if the
infinite goodness of God is to he maintained. Second, he has
not shown that man is free, hut only that it is possible to
suppose that God created man a free moral agent. The discus-
sion is purely logical and abstract—a kind of argument which
Berkeley himself rails against consistently.
In the Alciphron
,
however, Berkeley points to the em-
pirical evidence for freedom. The former logical argument
is repeated—that no contradiction is involved in supposing
an infinite power to have created a free agent, one who knew
that he acted, and who either condemned or approved his act.
But he will not base the case for human freedom on a mere non-
1
9
contradictory supposition. The only natural and just way
of thinking is to begin with concrete particulars and proceed
20to generalizations; the contrary leads only to confusion.
By complex and abstract reasoning he says to free-thinkers, it
is possible to prove almost anything,
but I am conscious of my own actions, this inward
evidence of plain fact will bear me up against
all your reasonings, however subtle and refined;
--I am conscious that I am an active being, who
} d WGB , I, 454.
WGB, II, 350.
Ibid., 354.
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can and do determine myself. --and thus, hy an
induction from particulars, I may conclude man
to he a free agent. 21
Berkeley upholds the empirical fact of conscious choice and
responsibility against logic-chopping.
But how does man act? If he is free to will, what deter-
mines the will? The will is not determined, says Berkeley,
22
and such an enquiry is only a foolish abstraction. The will
is active, hence ideas which are only passive cannot determine
orz.
it. "Men think they are free," says Berkeley, "but this
freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please, which
24freedom is consecutive to the will." Apparently, will and
the conscious act of choice are identical (as previously sug-
gested). Further, "as they please" implies that the will is
closely related to desire. This is borne out by the following:
Suppose an agent which is finite perfectly indif-
ferent, and as to desiring is not determined by
any prospect or cons iderati on of good, T say, this
agent cannot do an action morally good. 0
Again:
I’d never blame a man for acting upon interest.
„
He’s a fool that acts on any other principles. 20
Man is never indifferent in his choices; he chooses to suit his
interests. For self-love is found to be "a principle of all
H WGB, II, 352.22 Ibid., 355.
Johnston, GB, 78.
It
Ibid., 66.
Ibid., 18.
26 Ibid., 65.
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others the most universal, and the most deeply engraven in our
p 7hearts. " Judgments of good and evil depend upon the aug-
menting or impairing of man's happiness. In his natural state
P fl
man always wills to preserve himself and his own happiness.
His freedom consists in choosing in accordance with his in-
terests.
(4) The Thinking Self : It is obvious that if man acts in
accordance with his interests he must know what they are. That
he thinks and that in some way his thinking is connected with
his willing has been mentioned. This brings out the crucial
problem in Berkeley; the relation of the passive and active
aspects of the mind, and no complete treatment is possible.
Some of the explanations offered by Berkeley will be indicated,
however. Man's knowledge, he says, in the Principles
,
is
gained "not by discovering any necessary connexion between our
ideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of
pq
nature." If man follows the light of reason he notes the
"constant, uniform method of our sensations," he is led to a
knowledge of what is good for him and to the knowledge of a
good and perfect Being.
Ideas are imprinted on the mind; their origin is beyond
27 WGB
,
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the mind that perceives them, and the mind in knowing is only
the passive recipient of impulses from God by the mediation
31
of ideas. As long as man remains passive and recognizes only
the orderly succession of ideas, he has true knowledge; the
eternal laws of Nature are ’’engraved on his heart.” Any at-
tempt to reason abstractly from the relations of ideas in
themselves without respect to their external origin leads only
to error.
32Man is distinguished from animals in possessing reason,
but reason is only the power of recognizing divine laws in
nature. Man acts according to his interests which are divine-
ly revealed in the light of nature. "Season and truth exist
only in God, and man's rational freedom consists only in
acquiescing. He thinks and he wills as his thinking indicates
it is best for him to will. But he is not rationally self-
active; he remains subservient, is led to the eternal laws of
nature. Hence, rational freedom in any meaningful sense, is
33
not the possession of man —at least in the early phases of
Berkeley's thought.
B. The Moral Individual
The foregoing discussion merges into the problem of how
31 ;VGB
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man ought to act. The relation of thought to action and man's
freedom therein lead to the heart of Berkeley's ethical the-
ory. The intimate nature of the individual is for Berkeley
significant primarily for its ethical implications. The im-
portance of the individual can best- be discovered by a treat-
ment of the Berkeleyan ethics.
(l) Abstract Ethics : The Commonplace Book bears witness
of Berkeley's early interest in Locke's suggestion that moral-
ity could be mathematically demonstrated and determined. This
interest bore fruit in Passive Obedience
,
his first ethical
treatise
•
The "Eternal Law of Season, " he says, is the immutable,
34
universal, and necessary standard of morality. All men
recognize the existence of moral laws but no agreement is found
as to how these laws should be determined. Berkeley believes
they can best be determined by the deductions of reason.
Man by nature seeks his own interests, first in sensory
pleasures, later in higher and more permanent goods. But the
temporal world is as nothing in the sight of eternity. Hence
man is prompted to look to his eternal interests. How it is
evident, by the light of nature, that there is a
sovereign omniscient Spirit, who alone can make
us forever happy or forever miserable, it plainly
follows that a conformity to this will, and not
34 WGB, IV, 109.
35 Ibid., 104.
..
.
•
*
.
'
.
«
44
any prospect of temporal advantage, is the rule
whereby every man who acts up to the principles
of reason must govern and square his actions. 38
God's design for mankind and the laws promulgated to effect it
must be traced out in nature, for these are the moral laws.
Since God is infinitely good, he necessarily wills the good
of mankind and his laws, which are means to the furthering
his design, must be good. God makes no distinction between
persons; only moral goodness, conformity to his laws entitles
one man more than another to his favor. Hence, God's design
must have been that the well-being of mankind is to be procured
by the concurrent action of each individual in accordance with
_ 37law.
Berkeley has no use for the theory that the well-being of
mankind is best gained by merely enjoining individuals to act
with the utilitarian maxim in mind. Rather, certain estab-
lished laws should be observed, "which, if universally prac-
tised, have from the nature of things an essential fitness to
rr Q
procure the well-being of mankind." He saw only chaos in
the former alternative; few men are wise enough to see the
public good; every man would have his own conception of what
is good.
Moral laws are found by a comprehensive survey of human
36
v’/GB
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Whatever practical propositions doth to right
reason appear to have a necessary connexion with
the Universal well-being included in it, is to^
he looked upon as enjoined by the will of God. 39
As such they admit of no exception; they are in themselves
eternal rales of reason, resulting from the nature of things.
No private misfortune can be counted wrong if the moral laws
are observed, act rationally, i.e. by the divinely ordained
40
precepts, though the heavens fa^l. Truth, chastity, jus-
tice are obviously connected with the universal well-being.
So is submission to society. Propositions enjoining these
virtues are not sufficient for Berkeley's ethics. Propositions
positively stated are necessary for definition, but the state-
ment of a moral precept must admit of no exception or fulfil-
ment in degree. Hence they must be stated negatively in
practice, e.g. "Thou shalt not resist the supreme civil
power
.
The most obvious criticism to be made of this ethical
system is that it is completely out of accord with Berkeley's
anti-abstractionist position as stated in the "Introduction"
42
to the Principles . Moral laws as guides to practical action
are not derived empirically, and their authority is supported
by no experiential evidence. The laws and their authority are
39 WGB, IV, 108.
40 Ibid., 109.
41 WGB, IY, 133.
42 WGB, I, 237 ff. The following criticism leans heavily on
Wild, GB, 144 ff.
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deduced formally from the postulate of an infinite God. But
while he is inconsistent with his own principles, Berkeley is
also inconsistent within the formal method he employs. He
introduces a synthetic proposition into the traditional onto-
logical argument for God. God is conceived as infinitely per-
fect and rational. But Berkeley predicates infinite goodness
of Him also, which no analysis of "infinite, perfect, ration-
ality" can reveal. For Berkeley God must will the well-be-
ing of mankind since he is infinitely good as well as rational.
For the utilitarian principle introduced he offers no proof;
he merely assumes it. He is empirically correct in asserting
happiness to be the summum bonum
.
but he fails to justify its
introduction into a formal argument.
The ethical system presented here is an absolute, ration-
alistic rigorism. Moreover, it is a theological rigorism;
moral goodness consists entirely in the relations of God and
man in the conformity to God’s will. Berkeley has been called
43
a theological utilitarian, but this cannot be maintained in
the face of the statement "that nothing is a law because it
conduceth to the public good, but because it is decreed by the
44
will of God." He is certainly theological, but utilitarian-
ism is true for him here only because God has willed the good
of mankind and has established the laws necessary to its
43 Gf. WGB, IV, 98; MB, IV, 355; SB, III, 439.
44 WGB, IV, 121.
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attainment. Utility and happiness are only incidental to such
an absolutistic ethics. Berkeley’s attempt to establish ob-
jective morality by this formal method led him to formulate
moral laws negatively, thereby thinking to avoid all but ab-
solute and perfect obedience. He wanted an infallible stan-
dard of right and wrong, and apparently forgot that the es-
sence of morality is that it precedes action. In making moral
laws negative he failed to see that not acting may be just as
positive as acting, and that man looks to morality more for
guidance in what he should do, than in what he should refrain
from doing. In practice, Berkeley’s doctrine of passive
obedience is not moral but non-moral in any case, and is de-
finitely immoral in that no positive duty to act is established.
This abstract ethics destroys the significant active
character of the human being. Berkeley attempts to avoid this
in distinguishing between natural and moral laws; the former
are observed in the orderly course of nature; the latter are
also natural but their moral character lies in the fact that
they may be broken, while natural laws cannot. Moral laws
presuppose the voluntary actions of reasonable agents. 4 ^ But
when morality rests solely in the observance of negative pre-
cepts, ’’voluntary agents” becomes meaningless.
The trouble roots in Berkeley’s conception of ’’right
45 WGB
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reason.” Man only receives the divine commands; he cannot
infer them, but they are pressed upon him from without.
Rational self-activity reduces to a state of passive acquies-
cence. The "light of nature” reveals God. Natural moral laws
ordained by God necessarily work for the good of mankind; the
path of duty is clear. Government is the chief source of
peace, order, and well -being; and since it is the guardian of
these divine advantages, any resistance to civil authority is
46
a sin against God. The combination of the ”New Principle”
and formal ontology reduces the individual to a nonentity
and annihilates morality. This is not the whole of Berkeley’s
ethics, however. Passive Obedience merely marks the barren
harvest of the Lockean mathematical seeds, sown early in his
development.
(2) Concrete Ethics : The beginnings of a less abstract
account of the individual and morality are found in Berkeley’s
Guardian essays. The emphasis on self-interest gives way to
a more benevolent view.
ind as the attractive power in bodies is the most
universal principle which produceth universal ef-
fects, and is a key to explain the various pheno-
mena of nature; so the corresponding social
appetite in human souls ia the great spring and
source of moral actions. 7
Charity is the moving principle of human activity. It is man's
4 ° WSB, IV, 112-13.
47 Ibid., 188.
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duty as well as his interest to cherish and develop it. It
is his duty because it is agreeable to the intention of God
revealed in implanting this sentiment in the hearts of men;
his interest, because the good of the whole is inseparable from
that of its parts. Christianity is verified by its stress on
this sentiment so agreeable to God and to the hearts of men.
But still the "goodness" of charity is largely dependent on
its coincidence with God's will. Though more mellow, this
statement infringes but little on the formal argument for God.
Berkeley becomes realistic and practical in the Alciphron
,
twenty years later. Here is found a new criterion of moral
t ruth
.
But is not the general good of mankind to be re-
garded as a rule and measure of moral truths, of
all such truths as direct or influence the moral
actions of men?^®
That this is not just an inadvertent statement is proved con-
clusively on external evidence. In his Disc ourse to Magis -
trates (1736) Berkeley makes a similar statement, "the general
good of mankind being the rule or measure of moral truth,"
and cites the above-quoted section of the Alciphron in sup-
49port. He applies this test to the principles of the free-
thinkers, saying, "Their truth is not what I am now consider-
ing. The point at present is their usefulness." ^ Formal or
48 WG3, II, 63.
WGB
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abstract consistency is of no consequence when the public good
is at stake. Nothing is to be gained, but much is to be lost
5-
by upholding logically correct but socially hurtful theories.
From this practical foundation Berkeley proceeds by the
light of empirical fact to attack the theories of the free-
thinkers, which he considered wholly pernicious and socially
harmful. The argument put forward by Mandeville in the Fable
of the Bees he shows to be entirely contrary to fact—Private
vices are not public benefits, for they defeat their own ends.
The incontinent consumer is soon destroyed by his vices, and
his spending contributes only to further vice, not to bene-
52
ficial industries. Further, the true good of the public is
not wealth but happiness which consists of a healthy condition
53
of body and soul. Reasonable pleasures are more fitting to
the dignity of human nature; rational pleasures are the high-
54
est. The condition in which these higher pleasures are
realized constitutes virtue. Hence, virtue, not vice, is the
most useful notion for society.
He turns then to Shaftesbury's moral sense theory and
shows that virtue cannot be its own reward. The mind which
finds good in an action is carried beyond that action in
evaluating it. The individual considers whether others would
WGB
,
II, 152. Cf. Ibid,, 62.
ibid., 76 ff.
Ibid., 86.
54 Ibid., 96.

value it similarly. Also, in choosing to act in a certain way
he considers whether this action or another would not afford
more pleasure. There is in every act of choice some rational
activity, implying reference to some standard or ideal beyond
the immediate choice. But there must also be some motivation
to seek an ideal. Berkeley finds that there is no stronger
motive to action than one's own interest. Now, since man's
highest interest is in rational or notional pleasures, the
achieving of which constitutes virtue, he must be motivated by
56
virtue. But virtue in this sense goes far beyond immediate
action, implying the real existence and significance of these
higher pleasures. There must be some active, vital principle
in the universe which endures. Man's deepest motivation lies
in faith in the existence of such a principle and its identi-
fication with a kindly and intelligent Providence. To identify
it with fate, chance, or any unthinking principle is monstrous.
The theistic God, rewarding and punishing mankind, is an emin-
ently necessary motivation. "The belief of a God and Providence
ought to be encouraged in the state, and tolerated in good
company, as a useful notion." 57
Berkeley continues, showing that though the being of God
cannot be denied, human beings can have no demonstrable know-
WGB, II, 127.
Ibid., 129.
57 Ibid., 244. Cf. 359.
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ledge of his nature. And his nature, the essential thing,
58
determines what he wills for man. Human reason is limited,
and all knowledge must he based on faith.
Knowledge, I grant, in a strict sense can not he
had without evidence or demonstration; hut prob-,-
ahle arguments are a sufficient ground of faith.
Thus, faith in the kindly deity of Christianity is justified.
The opposite conclusion, that the world is at the dispensation
of chance, necessitates likewise the use of propositions of
which no distinct ideas are possible; hence faith must enter
60into agnosticism. Man should have faith in that conception
of the universe which best supplies his needs.
Berkeley has shown that some idea of a God is necessary.
He proceeds to argue that the Church of England has met this
utilitarian necessity. Further, the Church has an actual good
as history illustrates. He admits it has at times been guilty
of practices which are prejudicial to the public happiness.
But this is to be attributed not to Christianity but to Chris-
tians. The principles of Christianity stand above its actual
practice. To support it by unchristian methods only indicates
that some unchristian principle has supplanted true Christian-
ity for the time being. But Berkeley holds that Christianity
has been the source of far more good than evil. Its support
WGB
,
II, 178.
59 Ibid., 311.
Ibid., 333.
61 Ibid., 219.
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53
of institutions of learning in England has contributed more
than any other factor to English culture and learning. Sven
62
the free-thinkers must acknowledge a debt to the universities.
Further, it is a cornerstone of the English constitution and
"the only thing that makes us deserving of our freedom, or
63
capable of enjoying it. Hence, the positive good of Chris-
tianity as a motivation to virtue, its supplying of man's
religious needs through revelation, and the practical service
it has rendered and renders, justify human faith--not formal
logic
•
The most significant thing about this ethical system is
the emphasis on the practical reason. Berkeley recognizes the
significance of the early entry in the Commonplace Book
,
in
which he proposes to abandon all propositions of which no clear
idea is possible, save those relating to the Scriptures. Here
he says "an humble implicit faith becomes us," since these
matters are "altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach."
Abstract reason and implicit faith are side by side, yet
absolutely separate in his early philosophy. But now this
separation breaks down. The faith element in all true reason
is recognized; faith becomes reasonable through the recognition
that it is not an end in itself, but has an essential contri-
bution to make to human well-being.
|| WGrB , II, 223.
Ibid., 239.
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This is of primary importance for the conception of the
individual. As long as God was an absolute source of moral
laws directed to the public good, which are impressed upon
human minds, human freedom and knowledge depended on passive
acquiescence alone. But when this system is seen to be purely
arbitrary, when it is seen that there is an element of faith
in all knowing, rigorism breaks down and freedom counts for
something. Bor faith is purely a human act, whose direction
lies with the individual and cannot be impressed on him from
above. Berkeley becomes a sceptic in knowing, recognizing
the limitations of reason and is well content with probability
and utility. He asks that the individual have faith, only
requiring that this faith be justified by a recognition of
human needs for motivation and by evidence of a positive ten-
dency toward the higher—the rational goods.
The emphasis on faith leads into Berkeley T s theory of
practical social control. He says
There is a natural religion which may be dis-
covered and proved by the light of reason, to
those who are capable of such proof. But it
must be withal acknowledged that precepts and
oracles from heaven are incomparably better
suited to popular improvement and the good of
society than the reasonings of philosophers. 04
Men must be led by faith in all activity, social, moral, or
civil. The vast majority have neither inclination nor ability
54 WGB
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to act rationally. In practice men do live by faith; enter-
prise in the social or moral field must make use of this method.
Here Berkeley is not referring to the same type of faith which
he finds underlying all scientific or philosophic speculation.
He simply means faith in the powers that be, both civil and
religious. Man must trust those who direct his destiny.
C . Summary
Though the nature of the individual remains an unresolved
problem in Berkeley’s philosophy, this does not detract from
the fact that "persons" are for him very real and significant.
The mind which by perceiving gives existence to "ideas" must
exist, though how it exists remains uncertain. The individual
is free; he acts and knows that he acts. He guides his actions
in accordance with law and revelation in which he believes be-
cause he has probable knowledge that they work to his and to
all men’s interests. He cannot be said to be a utilitarian
for, though his ultimate goal is the "general happiness," it
is a goal made possible only by fealty to laws and institutions.
In his later ethics he is far from the mathematical formalism
of Passive Obedience . law must be observed, in the interests
of moral goodness, but moral goodness is good not because of
conformity to law in itself. Conformity to moral law is good
65 WGB, II, 283
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because the well-being of mankind is thereby insured.
The well-being of the whole is paramount in Berkeley’s
mind. Each individual is but part of a whole and is not to
be considered as independent. He is free and morally respon-
6 A
sible, but his is only a ’’legal liberty.” Berkeley’s account
of the individual and his responsibilities seems never to get
beyond the problem of the relation of man to law. In his early
thought this relation was absolute. Man accepts law directly
from God. later this absolute relation breaks down in the
recognition that man and God are mediated by faith. But man
is still viewed in juxtaposition to law, even though the end
of law becomes human happiness. "Human happiness” can be no
more than an abstraction, in this generalized sense. Berkeley’s
moral philosophy seems to reduce to the relations between an
unresolved problem and an abstraction— even though the ab-
straction is willed by God. Berkeley never examines the con-
crete relations of man and man. But still he is practical.
For him individuals do exist and live harmoniously and morally
under the laws of the English constitution and the precepts
of the Anglican Church.
66 WGB, II, 117; 238.
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CHAPTER IV
BERKELEY’S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
Thus far in the discussion the social scene has been very
much in the background. The present chapter will be concerned
with Berkeley's direct references to social processes and in-
stitutions .
A. Political Philosophy
As has been seen, Berkeley’s moral philosophy reduces to
the obligation of the individual to observe law, whether es-
tablished by divine or human necessity. A discussion of polit-
ical organization or structure, which constitute law in oivil
life entails answering the following problem: What is the
basis of political authority? Who shall hold this authority?
What are the functions of civil government? How are these
functions to be carried out? And what is the status of the
members of political society?
(1) The Basis of Political Authority : In Passive Obedi -
ence Berkeley points out that social control is, first of all,
necessary. There is in all men ”a natural tendency or dis-
position to social life.”-1' But social life is impossible
1 WGB, IV, 117. This, he says, distinguishes men from beasts.
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without laws, "the bond and cement of society.” Without laws
only a state of anarchy can exist.
So insufficient is the wit or strength of any sin-
gle man, either to avert the arils, or procure the
blessings of life, and so apt are the wills of
different persons to contradict and thwart each
other, that it is absolutely necessary several
independent powers be combined together, under
the direction— of one and the same will— I mean
the Law of the Society. 2
Hence, there must be in every society some supreme civil power
which makes laws and enforces their observance. The peace,
order and well-being of society must be insured, since man must
live in society, and these can be made possible only by laws
made and enforced by political authority.
Since political authority must exist, the next problem is,
what right does any particular organization holding such author
i+y have to exist? Where does political sovereignty lie? In
Passive Obedience Berkeley does not account for the sovereign-
ty of the supreme civil powers; he merely assumes that there is
such a power in every state. He refuses to discuss the con-
tract theory, pointing out that whatever the origin of govern-
ment might be does not affect one's obligation to obey govern-
4
ment. He recognizes the theory that sovereignty lies with
the people but holds that arguments from this can in no way
impeach upon the absolute obedience due the supreme civil
2 WGB, IV, 111.
3
Ibid., 103.
4 Ibid., 115.
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power since that power is rendered untouchable by the divine
5laws of nature. Here sovereignty lies with God.
In Berkeley's Discourse to Magistrates appears a statement
which in some measure clarifies his views.
There is no magistrate so ignorant as not to know
that power- -physical power--resides in the people;
but authority is from opinion, which authority is
necessary to restrain and direct the people's
power; and therefore religion is the great stay
and support of the state.
Obedience to all civil power is rooted in the
religious fear of God. --Take away this stay and
prop of duty, this root of civil authority; and
all that was sustained by it, or grew from it,
shall soon languish. 0
,/hile Berkeley recognizes the fact that actual sovereignty
lies within the power of the people, true sovereignty lies in
a higher plane. The only authority worth recognizing lies in
religion, "the first link of authority being fixed at the throne
7
of God." Berkeley has no use for republican schemes, es-
pecially those which overlook religion. Men must be religious;
and without a religious principle men can never be fit mater-
0ials for any society, much less for a republic.
But still this does not establish the authority on which
government is based in actual practice. Berkeley recognizes
9
as shown above that actual sovereignty is in the people. But
f WGB, IV, 124.
0 Ibid., 490-1.
7 Ibid., 490-1.
8 Ibid., 492-3.
9 Cf. WGB, IV, 446.
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true sovereignty rests with God. How are these to he recon-
ciled in one actual government? The solution to this problem
lies in a recognition of the fact that Berkeley is not inter-
ested in establishing a government, but in defending the es -
tablished government of England with its national Church.
Throughout his political thought the defense of existing in-
stitutions is of paramount importance. This makes the tracing
out of his actual political philosophy very difficult. It
would be grossly unfair to a thinker to infer that his views
expressed in a polemic would be identical with those he might
have expressed in a detached, critical treatise.
But all Berkeley’s writings on political subjects are
polemics. He believed that the English constitution and the
Anglican Church were necessary for the well-being of the
English people, and accordingly defends them. His political
philosophy demands that the authority of the state be sup-
ported by religion. The English government is supported by
the national Church, and in accord with religious truth.
Though this would indicate a static political society, he does
provide for change and modification. But modification of laws
is a serious matter, one which few are capable of doing right-
ly. Those most fitted to oversee the changing of the laws or
the constitution are those who are in power, those who direct
the government.^
-0
Berkeley is essentially a Tory in politics,
10 77GB, IV, 132.
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as attested by other evidence than his writings. 11 He was very
certain of the end which political organization should serve--
the good of mankind—and the religious truth it must embody.
But he was also certain that the present organization best met
these qualifications.
(2) The Governors : From the foregoing discussion it is
apparent that those who rule, those who make and enforce the
laws of the state, have a very responsible position in Berk-
eley’s political philosophy. In Passive Obedience only those
who are in power are capable of framing laws conducive to the
public good and consonant with God's will. This sounds like
a rather glib way of solving the legislative problem, and a
solution which is really no solution at all. But behind this
lies a very fundamental presupposition. Those who rule must
be capable of ruling . They must be able to see what is good
for society in the long run and what God’s will for man is.
Two quotations, one from the Commonplace Book
,
and one
from the Siris—the first and the last stages of Berkeley’s
thought— reveal his conception of how the holders of govern-
mental positions should be preoared.
It were to be wished that persons of the greatest
birth, honour, and fortune, would take that care
of themselves, by Education, Industry, Literature,
and a love of virtue, to surpass all other men
in knowledge and all other qualifications neces-
11 Wild, GB, 143-4
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sary for great actions, as far as they do in
Quality and Titles; that Princes out of them
might always choose men fit for all employments
and high trusts. 42
And forty years later:
And, whatever the world thinks, he who hath not
much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the
summum bonum
,
may possibly make a thriving earth-
worm but will most indubitably make a sorry pat-
riot and a sorry statesman.
Three things must be noted in connection with the qualifica-
tions which Berkeley sets up for governors as set forth above.
First, they must be educated . This point stands above all
others in Berkeley's political philosophy. The prime mover of
the state, the legislature, must be "well considered and under-
14
stood." The legislator must be a man of reflexions and
thought, having a good understanding of human nature and of
15
the true interests of mankind. Second, those who rule must
have more than "vulgar" knowledge. He must be imbued with the
highest principles of religion— "Order, Virtue, Duty, and Pro-
vidence." All men act by their principles; hence the prin-
ciples of the rulers must be of the highest. But third, it
is men of great birth and rank who should thus be prepared for
the positions of government. If this be true, Berkeley's gov-
ernment is not only aristocratic in the intellectual sense, but
l 2 Johnston, GB, 108.
WGB, III, 291.
14 WGB, IV, 476.
15 Ibid., 453; Cf. Ibid., 438.
16 WGB, IV, 485.
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is also an hereditary aristocracy. Is the conclusion to he
inferred that Berkeley remained at heart an aristocrat?
Too much faith cannot he put in the implications of the
above entry in the Commonplace Book . There is no way of know-
ing whether it represented Berkeley's own view, or whether it
was merely a theory which he set down for future cons iderat ion.
In so far as there is a major stress on the necessity of edu-
cating the nobility, and those of great wealth, it is in
keeping with the rest of his thought. But the requirement
that Princes should select officials only from the higher
class is distinctly unphilosophical. However, the same re-
quirement is implied in the Querist. In Query 346 he demands
the legislators he wise and educated. Following this in
Query 347 he asks.
Whether it does not follow that above all things
a gentleman's care should he to keep his facul-
ties sound and entire?^ 7
In other words every "gentleman" should look to his knowledge.
Why? Because gentlemen were the only persons who could pos-
sibly enter the legislature or assume any government office
in Berkeley's time. Hence while "birth, title, or fortune
—
add nothing of real worth either to mind or body,”-^ for
Berkeley, anything he says concerning the qualifications of
legislators must be directed to those possessing these pre-
17 WGB
,
IV, 453-4. Cf. Ibid., 438.
18 Ibid., 500.
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rogatives. Again it must be recognized that Berkeley was not
attempting to establish a new social institution but was de-
fending an established one. He points out the defects and the
needed remedy for the status quo
.
An aristocratic form of
government existed. His faith in reason, in education, and in
the power of religion led him to believe that it was the best
possible arrangement. Within its organization were legal means
and methods for improving itself and for better serving the
public end. There is nothing perfect under the sun., he says,
yet men should strive for perfection, especially in govern-
1 9
ment. Bor Berkeley the present government was far more per-
fectible than anything the free-thinkers offered.
(3) The Functions of Government : The chief functions of
government are directed towards securing the peace, order, and
well-being of society. Above all these were to be secured,
for Berkeley, by religion and education. The principles of
religion require the protection of human government as well
20
as the interest and aid of all good and wise men."' God’s will
must be seconded by human authority. Education is a prime
factor, as has been seen. Berkeley queries, "Whether a wise
State hath any interest nearer heart than the education of
21youth.” The government should establish institutions for
19 WGB, IV, 453.
20 Ibid., 495.
21 Ibid., 439. Cf. Ibid., 453.
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education and support them."'"
Berkeley recommends other practical functions of the state.
In times of depression he would have a public works program
supported by both the poor tax and by direct appropriat ion.
Such a program would work for the public good in two ways; by
keeping money in circulation, and by appealing to patriotism.
Public works should be in the form of national monuments,
S3
triumphal arches, etc. Further, the government should en-
courage and support private industry. He asks "whether pri-
vate endeavours without assistance from the public are likely
to advance our manufactures and commerce to any great de-
24
gree?" Berkeley considered the first step toward the well-
being of the state to be to "clothe and feed our people." But
2 8this was to be accomplished by promoting an honest "industry T
,
T
which required public support of private enterprise.
To this end Berkeley proposed a National Bank. Through-
out the Querist are found references to and arguments for this
agency. It seems that Berkeley was considering two types of
national bank. First, he speaks of the whole wealth of the
nation as constituting the national bank. But he also soeaks
of a bank established by public act and supported by public
H ,7GB , IV, 438. Cf. Ibid., 164.
Ibid., 333.
ZZ Ibid.
,
596.
Ibid., 421.
26 Ibid., 460, 461, 591.
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credit, as an agency separate from the national wealth. ' On
the basis of his suggestions for the former type of bank,
28
Berkeley has been accused of implying a communism. This
does not seem justified. The bank which he hoped to set up
was an agency which, though established by the legislators and
directed by them, was distinctly separated from the public
treasury. It was to carry on business much as any private in-
stitution, though at more liberal terms. Its stock was to be
provided by a special tax. loans were to be made ?Teither to
particular persons on ready money or on mortgage, or to the
?9
uses of the public on its own credit." By the "public”
Berkeley means the public in the abstract, i.e. the government
of the state, not the public at large. Berkeley’s national
Bank was primarily a means to supply Ireland’s lack of a fluid
capital, and hence make industrial and commercial expansion
possible, and not a gesture of benevolence toward the people
at large
.
That there was no communistic tendency in Berkeley’s
political philosophy is proved by his emphasis on property.
He asks, "Thether it can be reasonably hoped, that our state
30
will mend, as long as property is insecure among us?" True,
31
he does argue for a more equal distribution of wealth, but
WGrB, IV, 588.
Hone and Hossi, (BB, 203), hold this view.
29 WGB, IV, 597.
5° Ibid., 575.
31 Ibid., 431, 440.
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he does so because he thinks industry will thereby be encou-
raged. Property is to be guarded bylaw; to determine property
by any other rule than the established law he considers dan-
32gerous.
Another government function suggested by Berkeley which
is worthy of note is the proposal that schedules of trade and
records of foreign commerce be made Industry was to have
a sound theoretical basis. Berkeley also held that govern-
ment should watch over fashions and amusements. Fashions,
particularly in women's clothing, he thought absolutely per-
34
nicious. He urges "reasonable” fashions and the resumption
36
of the sumptuary laws. A rigid censorship should be main-
tained, he thought, over public "diversions," those prohibited
which have a direct tendency toward moral corruption, and a
36
reformation of the Drama be effected.
(4) The Methods of Government : The aim of all civil and
religious institutions, says Berkeley, is to tame this animal,
man, and fit him for society— "to make him amenable to order,
to inure him to a sense of justice and virtue, to withhold
him from ill courses by fear, and encourage him in his duty by
hopes." The best method of achieving these ends is a "proper
'.7GB, IV, 452.
Ibid., 437, 472, 595.
Ibid., 423.
Ibid., 328, 436.
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37
education.” "Men's behavior is the result of their prin-
38
ciples,” hence a government must look to the principles of
its citizens. rTA prevailing disorder in the principles and
opinions of its members is ever dangerous to society and cap-
39
able of producing the greatest public evils.” Order is
necessary for the existence of a state, Berkeley argues.
There must, therefore, of necessity, in every
state, be a certain system of salutary notions,
a prevailing set of opinions, acquired either
by private reason and reflexion, or taught and
instilled by the general reason of the public;
that is, by the law of the land. 40
Every state must have its ideology. Because most men have not
ability to acquire this by their own reasoning, the bulk of
mankind must be indoctrinated. ”You shall find all men full
41
of opinions, but knowledge only in a few.” The minds of
men, especially in youth, must be filled with good opinions
or "prejudices,” lest they acquire bad prejudices by them-
42
selves
.
Religious awe, the precepts of parents and masters,
the wisdom of legislators, and the accumulated
experiences of ages supply the place of proofs
and reasonings with the vulgar of all ranks. 3
Hence Berkeley's government is to proceed by distinctly
37 WGrB
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totalitarian methods, recognizing men's affinities for pre-
judice rather than reason, and adapting man's weaknesses to
its conceptions of his true interest. Berkeley does not deny
freedom of rational inquiry. He says that no man should deny
the laws and "notions" instilled in him hy Church and State
without "good reason." But even if someone should think they
had such "good reason," he has no right to preach his private
judgment to others, against the civil and religious laws which
protect him. 44 Men must live under and accept the "set of
salutary notions" embodied in the civil constitution and the
doctrines of the Church. The acceptance of this ideology is
to be assured and maintained by religious awe, by fear of
punishment and hope of reward.
(5) The Status of Citizens : The public aim in every in-
telligent state, says Berkeley, should be that each member,
according to his just pretensions and industry, should have
45power. For power is property and is the goal of all in-
46dustry. There are two ways of acquiring power, through
inheritance and through industry. Above all, the citizens
are entitled to the fruits of their industry. Industry rather
than inheritance has, or should have, the prior claim to the
47protection of law. Lav/ should be completely impersonal,
44 WGB, IV, 488.
45 Ibid., 422.
46 Ibid., 424.
47 Ibid., 453.
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48
each person having equal rights in a just civil society.
In return for this assurance of the security of property
the citizens are obligated to be industrious. The poor should
labor. If they do not or cannot find employment, the public
49has a right to employ them or find employment for them. The
upper classes should also labor, as befits their rani. At any
50
rate, they have no right to be idle. Berkeley’s conception
of the most thriving state is one in which the lower part is
51
industrious and the upper part wise. Every individual has
qualities, either mental or physical, which are useful to the
state, and each should make the best possible use of his
52position and his powers.
The main point is to employ and also to multiply the peo-
ple. The citizens are obligated to procreate and to raise up
children who will become good citizens. To this end Berkeley
would do away with the dowery system and allow marriages to
53
be made with "good-liking." He even goes so far as to sug-
gest the application of practical genetics, proved successful
in horse-breeding, to the human species.^ As further en-
couragements to procreation he would penalize all old bachelors
48 VGrB, IV, 440.
49 Ibid., 456.
50 ibid., 439.
S Ibid.02 Ibid., 454. Cf. Ibid., 422.
53 Ibid., 440.
54 Ibid.
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5 5by forcing them to support asylums for orphans and foundlings,
reward those having a certain number of children, and demand
the forfeit of half the unentailed estates of those who die
unmarried.
^
The citizen is ensured his temporal security. His obli-
gation to become industrious is also his interest. He is en-
joined to procreate and to inculcate good habits in his child-
ren. If of high rank he should be wise and learned and busy
in the important activities of the state. Good and happy
citizens are the necessary constituents of the good state.
,TTo be a real patriot, a man must consider his countrymen as
God's creatures, and himself as accountable for his acting to-
57
wards them." The good citizen desires the public good,
studies it and strives to promote it. He aims at his own good
in the public good, considering himself as subservient to it
58
and as a part of a whole, not as a whole in himself. The
good of the whole can only be gained by good laws, enforced by
wise rulers who are supported by religious truths.
There seems little possibility, according to Berkeley's
political philosophy, that the general citizenry should init-
iate any changes or reforms in government. There are some
few statements to be found which may signify some slight
55 WGB
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possibility of such a happening. In Passive Obedience he says
that, in the event of an extreme tyranny, while the people may
not resist the tyrant directly, they may call upon his minis-
ters, representing to them their limitation by the laws of God
59
and nature. Divine authority is supreme. Men ought never
to act contrary to God's law.°^ But still man ought never
to put his conscience above the laws under which he lives.
There seems an antimony here which is unresolved. In the Dssay
Toward Preventing the Buin of Gre at Britain
,
Berkeley reminds
the politicians that if either Whig or Tory party were to ruin
the other, the result would be fatal for the country . Poli-
tical battles must exist, apparently, but conflict should be
directed toward the good of the country, not merely to the
61downing of the opposing faction. In his Maxims Concerning
Patriotism appears this statement: "A patriot could hardly
O
wish there was no contrast in the state." To what exactly
this statement refers is only a matter for conjecture. The
following maxim is in the same vein. "Ferments of the worst
kind succeed to perfect inaction." 0 ^ Whatever the specific
reference may have been, it seems valid to infer that Berkeley
recognized the need for discussion and difference of opinion
WGB
,
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61 Ibid., 334.
62 Ibid., 563.
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in political matters, felt that a certain amount of dissension
was a healthy sign, and feared the consequences of a too
placid domestic scene. The true patriot must admit the pos-
sibility of an honest difference of opinion. But this dif-
ference and discussion is reserved for legislators, and those
who understand the public needs. There could be no question
in Berkeley's mind about the fundamentals of the constitution
and the Church. He remains doubtful "whether those men who
move the cornerstones of a constitution may not pull an old
64
house down on their heads?
(6) Summary : If it is probable that Berkeley's epistemo-
logy was largely inspired by Locke, it seems just as probable
that his political philosophy, particularly in his later life,
had its roots in Plato. He refers to the Platonic emphasis
on the observance of religion fin the Laws) in arguing the
65
necessity of religion in government. He says, "Certainly
where the people are well educated, the art of piloting a
66
state is best learned from the writings of Plato." He speaks
of him, along with Pythagoras and Aristotle, as "most consum-
mate in politics," and is completely at one with his combina-
tion of practical philosophy with "abstracted and sublime
speculations; the clearest light being ever necessary to guide
64
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the most important act ions. TT The qualifications Berkeley
sets up for Ttlegislato rs ,T would make them very similar to
Plato’s "guardians. " Berkeley's government is to he headed
hy wise men, by "philosophers." He proposes no great change
in organization. The uneducated gentry were to him the great-
est disgrace and calamity of Ireland. Berkeley's faith in
education led him to attempt to make the gentry philosophers.
He never suggests that the philosophers should become members
of the gentry. His failure to recognize the latter possib-
ility may be excused by the uncertainty of his times. However,
Plato hoped to place philosophers in political positions by
the latter method in times no less uncertain. Berkeley's
position as a churchman may have contributed to his aversion
to changing the political constitution. His polemics on be-
half of the constitution are focussed on the arguments against
the national Church. Whatever his motivations, his political
theory is constructive only in so far as it aims at improving
the existing institutions of government. He offers no new
institutions. He does point out that the existing ones may
work if administered through reason and divine insight.
B. Economic Theory
Since Berkeley lived within the period known as the "Age
67
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of Mercantilism”—1500-1800— it is reasonable to expect that
his economic theory was predominantly mercant ilistic . Raffel,
after a critical study of the Querist
,
concludes: "Was Berk-
eley uns bietet, ist praktische Politik im alten Pahrwasser
6 8
des spateren Merkantilismus.” The immediate problem here is
not whether Berkeley was more or less a mercantilist, but
exactly what his economic views were. This entails a discus-
sion of the nature of wealth, the nature of economic organiza-
tion, national self-sufficiency, and foreign trade.
(1) The Nature of /ealth : Berkeley’s conception of wealth
is implied in the very first entry in his Querist: "Whether
there ever was, is, or will be, an industrious nation poor,
69
or an idle rich?” It is made explicit in the fourth entry:
"Whether the four elements, and man’s labour therein, be not
70
the true source of wealth?" Wealth for Berkeley is industry
and its products, in whatever form they may be. The true end
and aim of men is power; to this end all industry is directed.
71
Wealth, power, and property are synonymous for Berkeley.
The true wealth of the nation consists in the securing and de-
veloping of this stock of power. Property is the means whereby,
and the form under which power is counted, transferred, and
68 Raffel, IBP, 5.
69 WQB
,
IV, 422. This may be a foreshadowing of the Smith
Marx labor theory of value. See below, Qj, n.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., 422; 424; 432; 450; 453; 582; 585.
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7 £preserved. Secure property and incite the people to gain
control of it, says Berkeley. The wealthy nation is that one
which is industrious, in which each individual sets himself to
the securing and developing of power through property.
Money for Berkeley is purely extrinsic. It is useful only
in so far as it stirs up industry, enabling men to participate
73
mutually in the fruits of their labor. Beal wealth is the
power to command the industry of others. But this necessitates
some medium, some system of tokens or symbols, by which power
may be recorded. Money serves this function. It is of no
consequence what it is made of.
Provided the wheels move, whether it is not the
same thing, as to the effect of the machine, be
this done by the force of wind, or water, or
animals? 7^
Since money is only a symbol, the important thing to the
nation is not the amount of money but the rate at which it
75
circulates. Too much gold within the country might even be
harmful. Berkeley speculates on the effects which the dis-
covery of a gold mine in Ireland would have. He concludes
that, if the amount of increase were more than was necessary
for circulation, the results would be ruinous. There would
be an influx of foreigners. Honest industry would be neglected
72
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and every man possessing money would attempt to set himself
up as a gentleman. High prices would result and the poor would
76
suffer. Anything which tends to lessen industry is per-
nicious. Too much money, either gold or silver, has this re-
sult, as shown hy the example of Spain since the discovery of
77precious metals in America.
Berkeley proposes that a paper currency he provided
through the agency of a national bank, based primarily on land.
Such a currency, he argues, would be very secure. There would
be no danger of its being lost through an unfavorable balance
of trade. Obviously, land could not be exported, and paper
7 R
money would be of no use to those outside of the country.
For the foreign trade, bills of exchange could be offered, and
79
the absence of gold and silver would not be missed. Such a
bank would be established and supervised by the legislature,
80its sole purpose to be the furthering of industry."
(2) Be onomic Organization : Berkeley’s economic theory is
based on the industry of individuals. The aim of every wise
state, he says, should be to encourage industry in its members.
The security of private property is insured by the protection
of law. Berkeley suggests that an equal distribution of wealth
Z* WGB, IV, 428.77 Ibid., 425.
78 Ibid., 451.
78 Ibid., 424.
80 Ibid., 441; 586.
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would be most conducive to industry and to the public good. x
He does not imply by this any socialistic scheme, any actual
redistribution by mandate. He believes that it can be effected
by industry, chiefly by a change in agricultural practices.
He inquires
"/hether large farms under few hands, or small ones
under many are likely to be made most of? And
whether flax and tillage do not naturally mul-
tiply hands, and divide lands into small hold-
ings, and well improved? 82
A great bar, he thinks, to this change from sheep-raising to
flax has been the shortage of small coins. The circulation of
power among the common people, whose industry feeds the state,
must be facilitated. With an ample currency of small denomin-
ations he thinks that the agricultural laborers will be en-
abled to secure small holdings, hence breaking up the large
83
farms and ending wasteful practices.
While industry arises with individuals, Berkeley would
organize it on a more comprehensive scale. The divided force
84
of men is but a rope of sand. The whole nation is to be
85
considered as a family. The "momentum,” the sum of all the
active faculties, both corporeal and intellectual, of the
members of a state, constitutes its true stock of wealth.
81 WGrB
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This "momentum" must, in the wise state, be a united action.
The concerted action of the corporeal faculties of the state--
its suply of raw materials and labor— is impossible without
the aid of the intellectual faculties. The economic forces of
the state must be subjected to a wise plan, conceived and di-
rected by the legislature. Without such a plan the particular
members of the state will by their opposing movements destroy
86
the "momentum" of the whole. Berkeley proposes a planned
economy. The wealth of the state and its members is to be
guaranteed by comprehending the industry of each member under
a plan for the whole.
(3) National Self-Sufficiency : Berkeley is very much at
one with the mercantilists in maintaining the theory of the
closed state.
Whether, if there was a wall of brass a thousand
cubits high round this kingdom, our natives might
not nevertheless live cleanly and comfort y,
till the land, and reap the fruits of it?
He wonders why "an Hyperborean island inhabited by reasonable
creatures" might not be supposed as an Atlantis, or a Utopia
ity of the Irish soil and the poverty of its inhabitants. The
domestic industry should be developed at all costs; if such is
have been. 88 He marvels at the disparity between the fertil-
86 v/GrB
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done, Ireland need depend on no foreign country for either
oq
food or raiment. The materials to he used in building can
be well supplied at home "without ransacking the four quarters
of the globe." Ireland, he feels, is determined to an "in-
ward commerce" by nature. The natural facilities for trans-
portat ion—the rivers and harbors--should be supplemented by
canals and roads. In domestic industry lies Ireland's salva-
tion. By exploiting this, by encouraging industry through
a national bank, Ireland could easily become a self-sufficient
nation.
(4) Pore ign Trade : As seen from the foregoing discussion,
Berkeley felt that Ireland had no great need, if any, for
foreign trade. Domestic industry, if developed, would provide
for the most pressing needs—the feeding and clothing of the
poor--and, he feels, is this were accomplished, the conven-
90
iences of the rich would soon follow. But, if it be conclud-
ed that foreign trade is necessary, it should be very carefully
decided which branches should be entertained. National wants
should be the rule of trade and the most pressing wants should
be considered first. His chief objection to foreign trade is
that it is chiefly devoted to luxuries. Poreign commodities
89 WGB, IV, 433. This dream, almost medieval, of a self-
sufficient state is in general similar to Fichte'
s
geschlossene Handel s t aat . ^ichte's emphasis on sharing
the produce of the state is more socialistic than
Berkeley's view. Gf. Fichte, S\V, III, 397 ff.
90 7GB, IV, 431; 437.
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should he imported in exchange for domestic superfluities.
Manufactured articles rather than foodstuffs should he ex-
ported; there is a great scarcity of the latter, and the for-
91
mer are a chief support of domestic employment. Imports
which have a tendency to promote industry should he encouraged,
92
while those which tend to promote luxury should he discouraged.
He recommends friendlier relations with England, dis-
paraging the enmity between the two countries. The Irish
should strive to gain the English as friends, since they can-
93
not hope to compete with them as rivals. They are one and
the same people, with the same prince and the same interests.
Jould not it he far wiser to cultivate this interest than to
94distrust and deny it? The chief hone of contention, Eng-
land's forbidding the wool trade to Ireland, is more of a
blessing than a curse. Sheep-raising requires much land and
few laborers. Ireland is well rid of it since the other uses
to which land may he put require much labor, hence greater
domestic industry.
As far as foreign trade in general is concerned, Berk-
eley is distinctly a mercantilist. Eoreign commerce is to
he carried on only when absolutely necessary and then in such
a way that the r, power rT of the nation is maintained, if not
91
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enhanced. He holds to the balance of trade theory consistent-
ly, thoiigh in a modified form. His view of the extrinsic
character of gold and silver led him to deny the older form
of the theory. His quiery,
.The ther the general rule, of determining the profit
of a commerce by its balance, doth not, likfe other
general rules, admit of except ions ? 9 5
is not to be interpreted as a denial of the fundamental theory
He is questioning only the traditional method of measuring the
profit of the balance. As Raffel points out,
Berkeley’s Handelsbilanztheorie ist also auf
einen mehr liberalen Boden erwachsen, insofern
sie nicht die Geldquantitaten, sondern die qr
heimische Betriebsamkei t zur Grundlage hat. °
But it is still very much a balance of trade theory as is
97
shown by many other references. The power of the nation
must be guarded by a judicious balancing of exports and im-
ports.
(5) Summary : Much the same criticism is to be directed
against Berkeley's economic theory as directed against his
politics. He only proposes ways of making an old structure
efficient. Pew innovations, if any, are to be found in his
98
contributions to economic theory. His emphasis on the
95 ;/G3
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98 sir Leslie Stephen's statement to the contrary. Cf.
DN3, IV, 355.
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extrinsic character of money is an advance over the earlier
mercantilists hut their emphasis on "treasure" has ceased to
9 9be accepted as characteristic. His National Bank was
nothing new. The Bank of England had been established in
1695. A Scotchman, John Law, had advocated a bank based on
land for the purpose of issuing paper currency in 1705.
The governmental regulations he proposed in commerce are
typical of the mercantilist era, and should not be inter-
preted as a socialistic move of government into business.
Berkeley's emphasis on industry as the true measure of wealth,
may anticipate in a general way the labor theory of value,
but Berkeley does not elaborate his affirmation. It seems
to be more of a generalized descriptive statement rather than
the basis of a new view of value, and has only an apparent
106
resemblance to the theory developed by Fume, Smith and Marx.
G. Social Theory
There still remain some points to be discussed in Berk-
eley's social philosophy which are of note in themselves
aside from their pertinency to political and economic matters.
Berkeley's views on social structure per se
,
and on education
93 Haney, HET, 119. He admits they were confused about the
exact nature of wealth.
100 Haney, HET, 126.
101 Ibid., 121-2.
102 por the labor theory of value see Hume, EMPL, I, 293-4;
Smith, WN, I, 44; Marx, GAB, I, 45.
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and religion as ends in themselves, must he noted.
(1) The Structure of Society : Throughout Berkeley’s
practical philosophy are to he found references to social
classes. He recognizes the existence of gentlemen and com-
moners, of men of wealth and laborers. The idea of a class-
less society was completely foreign to him. He simply recog-
nized the fact that the hulk of mankind were naturally infer-
ior, less intelligent, and less fitted in every respect for
the responsible positions of society. All of his practical
proposals for society are based on this recognition. Because
the gentry are by birth and wealth, by force of circumstance,
the most important for social control, he enjoins them to
become wise so that their influence may be extended in a
manner befitting their position. And because the great mass
of the people are born to a condition which makes them labor-
ers and followers rather than leaders, he enjoins them to
labor honestly and to have faith in the counsels of their
natural and legal superiors. He does not deny that one may
rise from a lower to a higher position. In the 7ord to the
’Vise he mentions an example of a self-made man.-^3 But he
makes no provision for such a rise. He is content to develop
the qualities of the ranks of society as he finds them.
At many occasions he proposes to achieve social harmony
103 7GB, IV, 552.
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and the good of the state by pitting one rank against another,
or considering them as necessary complementary forces in
society. He queries.
Whether it is possible that a state should not
thrive, whereof the lower cart were industrious,
and the upper part wise?104
And again,
Whether facilitating and quickening the circula-
tion of power to supply wants be not the promot-
ing of wealth and industry among the lower peo-
ple? And whether upon this the wealth of the
great does not de oend?-*-05
Speaking in behalf of domestic industry, he asks whether TT it
would not provide equally for the magnificence of the rich
i n a
and the necessities of the poor?" J Both upper and lower
classes must be accounted for in some way, for the one can-
not exist without the other.
Brom the fact that mankind is governed by imitation
rather than reason he finds further use for classes, frugal
fashions in the upper rank and comfortable living in the
107lower is most effective in multiplying the inhabitants.
The lower always attempt to emulate the upper classes. It
then behooves the upper classes to be reasonable and frugal
in their adherence to fashions and customs. Bor a general
good taste in a people conduces much to their thriving.
104 WGB
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Further, it is sometimes good that the upper classes soend
freely, though within limits. The industry of the lower people
depends much upon the expense of the upper. "Conspicuous
consumption," while of direct economic benefit to the common
people, is also a spur to industry. Berkeley queries, " ’.The the r
the creation of wants he not the likeliest way to produce in-
dustry in a people? "3-09 And again, ",diether comfortable living
doth not produce wants, and wants indust ry, and industry
wealth?"”^^ "Conspicuous consumption" and class emulation are
seen to be very important auxiliaries in society as conceived
by Berkeley.
Berkeley does not seem to have been very sympathetic in
regard to the poor, nor to have had a very deep insight into
the causes of poverty. The chief factor recognized by him
is indolence. He speaks of the obligation of the state to
provide employment for its commoners but lays a major emphasis
upon its right to demand industry of them."1'^^ The threat of
hard labor he considers the best cure for indolence, not recog-
112
nizing that there might actually be no employment available.
The system he suggests for caring for the poor, the setting up
of workhouses in which those who are able to work could suppoitt
108
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those less fortunate, may have been workable after it was once
in operation. But in recommending the fixing of the poor-tax
at a medium in every parish, he was laying a heavey burden
on those parishes having the most poor and hence less able to
113
support it.
Berkeley was particularly uncritical in his attitude to-
ward the Homan Catholic poor of Ireland. The condition of
these unfortunate he considered due almost entirely to their
"innate hereditary sloth" and "antipathy to labour.
"
4
-*-4 it
was to be remedied by inculcating in them the spirit of
"honest industry," which virtue he called upon the Homan
115Catholic clergy to exhort. He would have the laborer work
all hours, and demanded that his wife and children also labor.
Hor in Holland a child of five years is supported by its own
116labor. He recognizes the restrictions against Catholics,
i.e. against owning land, and entry to civil positions. (In
the Querist he had advised allowing them to purchase for-
117 118feited lands, and to enter Trinity College, since it
rendered them more tractable to proselyting.) He disparages
the want of these spurs to industry, holding them of little
account, and pointing out that life itself is temporary,
1J? WG3, IV, 324.114 Ibid., 543.
Ibid., 543, et passim.
116 Ibid., 553.
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118 Ibid., 439.
^==____
,
,:r r
'
'
.
-
.•
f
.
t
.
-
.
.
88
"I 1 Qhence estates are not greatly to be desired.
Berkeley's attitude toward crime and criminals should be
noted. He queries,
Whether some way might not be found for making
criminals useful in public works, instead of
sending them either to America or to the other
worid? f ^0
He considered death an inadequate punishment for felony. The
free-thinkers had so destroyed the belief in a future state,
1that death held no fears for criminals. Servitude, hard
labor and chains he thought would be more discouraging, and
in this manner criminals would be forced to repay the damage
done to society. Crime could best be eradicated by preven-
tion. The best preventive measures would be to make examples
of criminals. Ho compassion should be shown, but all crime
should be vigorously prosecuted. ^
(2) Education : The primary emphasis on education, by
indoctrination or otherwise, has been noted throughout Berk-
eley's philosophy. It was for him the best method for the
gaining of any end. Education is not purely instrumental,
however. The pursuit of intellectual pleasures was for him
the highest of all values. He regarded the public schools
and universities as the finest "nurseries of men for the
119 WG-B, IV, 548-9.
120 Ibid., 426.
121 Ibid., 457.
122 113 id.
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service of the church and state. ,T But they were also of in-
trinsic value
as places designed to teach mankind the most re-
fined luxury, to raise the mind to its due per-
fection, and give it a taste for those enter-
tainments which afford the highest transport .123
Public institutions of learning owed their existence to re-
ligion. The church had been responsible for the safekeeping
of the knowledge of the ages. Private persons and the state
had contributed bountifully to the support of schools and
had done so, according to Berkeley, largely from religious
124
motivation. Education remained under the supervision of
the church, supported by the public treasury. He saw no
benefit for the public in the proposal that the revenues for
the encouragement of religion and learning be made hereditary
125in the hands of certain lay-lords and "overgrown commonersV
For Berkeley education and religion lay together.
(3) Religion : Throughout Berkeley’s practical philosophy
religion has been the supremely necessary instrument. Human
authority must be supported by a fear of the divine authority.
Through religion the state is enabled to require industry
and obedience of its members. Without religion patriotism
123 7GB, IV, 164
124 ibid.
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and temporal power are meaningless. Berkeley would use re-
ligion as an instrument in extending the colonial empire and
“I pfl
commerce. ° He recommends it as an insurance of better
slaves, in the American colonies, arguing with the planters
that it would be of advantage to their affairs
to have slaves who should obey in all things
their master’s according to the flesh, not with
eye-service, as men-please rs
,
but in singleness
of heart, as fearing God; that gospel liberty
consists with temporal servitude; and that their
slaves would only become better slaves by being
Christians .127
Religion is the most effective instrument in discouraging
crime. It is the guardian and motivation of higher education.
Religion is the protector of the instrument by which its own
principles are carried out—the church--and of the revealed
truths by which its own existence is insured.
Religion is far more than an instrument for Berkeley.
It meets the deepest needs of mankind. But he will not
identify it with any one church—not even his own. In a
letter to Sir John James, a friend who was considering enter-
ing the Roman Catholic Church, he says:
I think it a peculiar blessings to have been ed-
ucated in the Church of England. My prayer,
nevertheless, and my trust in God is, not that
I shall live and die in this Church, but in
the true Church. Bor, after all, in respect
126 77GB, IV, 356. Berkeley was probably the first to use
the term '’religious education.” WGB, II, 151. Edu-
cation was always for him a religious enterprise
directed toward a religious ideal.
127 7GB, IV, 347. This is not to go unqualified.
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of religion, our attachment should only be to the
truth.
For Berkeley, the final judgment in all things was, is
it true? For practical reasons he saw' that existing institu-
tions which had, and still continued to work toward the high-
est good of mankind, must be supported. The practical reason
must be the standard of temporal affairs. Making religion a
'’notional 1 ' matter he feels has been an "infinite disservice."
For
The Christian religion was calculated for the
bulk of mankind, and therefore cannot reason-
ably be supposed in subtle and nice notions. 29
Faith is necessary for the harmonious conduct of practical
affairs. Only by faith in government, its laws, and in the
wise men who direct it, in the light of truth and religion,
can the peace, order, and well-being of society be insured
and perpetuated.
128
:7GB, IV, 532.
129 Ibid., 410.
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CHAPTER V
BERKELEY AS A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHER
The evaluation of Berkeley as a social philosopher is
made difficult hy the apparent inconsistency between the dif-
ferent stages of his thought. It is made even more difficult
by what seems an obvious disjunction between his theoretical
philosophy
—
particularly the Princ iples and Hylas and Phil -
onus--and in his later practical philosophy, especially the
Alciphron
.
the Querist
,
and his various Disc ourses . Empir-
ical logic finds a violent contrast in concrete reasonable
faith. The transcendental idealism of the Siris seems only
to add to the perplexity. One school of interpretation would
accept Berkeley’s thought at its face value and would find no
essential congruence or logical development. The Alciphron
is a religious polemic having no roots in Berkeley's earlier
thought. The Siris seems entirely removed and in itself in-
coherent.^ On the other hand, the majority of scholars have
arrived at an opposite conclusion—that Berkeley's thought
follows a continuous, though indeed often inconsistent
,
course of development. Here the Alciphron is recognized as
a polemic, but an underlying shift of position to a more con-
1 Hone and Rossi, 33, 215 ff
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crete logic is found paramount. The Siris becomes in many ways
the key to Berkeley's thought, through his recognition of
2human limitations and the ideal of truth. " The latter view
seems more defensible. The problem for this study is whether
Berkeley's thought from a social viewpoint can be considered
as a consistent whole. Social philosophy was defined as a
comprehensive view of society, its members, its processes,
its instruments, and its ends. Is such a view to be found in
Berkeley? Are social-philosophical principles to be found
persistently and consistently throughout Berkeley's thought?
Aside from this internal criticism some historical eval-
uation of Berkeley's social thought must be made. Does it
represent deep insight into the social problems he faced?
Are the theories and proposals he puts forward adequate?
Fianlly, what does Berkeley's social thought offer for present
social theory?
A. The Consistency of Berkeley's Social Thought
(1) The Status of the Individual : As has been shown, the
individual or rather his primary attribute, the mind, is cen-
tral to Berkeley's metaphysics and epistemology. The indi-
4
vidual is morally responsible. In his obedience lies the
2 Wild, G-B, 488 ff.
3 Supra, 33.
4 Supra, 47.
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5
strength of the state, and only "by his honest industry is the
economic well-being of society made possible.
Berkeley's emphasis on the passivity of the mind in know-
ing carries over into his theory of society, at least as far
as the great mass of mankind is concerned. There is, however,
a significant change underlying this transition. Passivity
of mind in the Principles is an epistemological fact. In his
'
political writing he calls for passivity through faith. Though
theoretically untenable, this superficial aspect of passivity
indicates the true status of the individual in society for
Berkeley. The individual is subservient to the whole. This
7is Berkeley's position in Passive Obedience and the Ale
i
-
8phron. The lesson of Berkeley's political philosophy is thatj-
no man may set his private conscience against the national
9
conscience. Berkeley's economic theory requires the con-
currence of each individual in the design of national economy?" 0
In Passive Obedience Berkeley shows little respect for
11
the intellect of the masses. The public good is best as-
12
sured by indoctrination; the state must have its ideology.
Imitation rather than' reason is the rule of fashion, and class
5 Supra, 58.
5 Supra, 77.
7 Supra, 43.
8 Supra, 53.
9 VYGB, III, 498.
1-0 Supra, 78.
11 Supra, 44.
12 Supra, 68.
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13
emulation is a basic spur to economic endeavor.
Though the individual is empirically free and, to a degree,
rational, the good of society is paramount. Therein consists
the true good and happiness of its members. The inferiority
of the great mass of individuals makes imperative their in-
doctrination. The individual is by nature and should be by
law subservient to the whole. Berkeley's conception of the
status of the individual is uniformly consistent thoughout
his writings.
(2) Self- interest : This principle Berkeley regards as
the primary motive of human nature. Morality and religion
turn this to good use in making men seek their eternal inter-
ests. 14 This ' tendency of religion to turn men from their im-
mediate selfish interests to their eternal interests Berkeley
regards as one of the chief reasons government should support
the church. An appeal to self-interest in the form of future
15
rewards and punishments is an effective bar to crime.
In his economic and political philosophy Berkeley's em-
phasis on self-interest takes a decidedly materialistic tinge.
One of the chief functions and responsibilities of govern-
16
ment is the security of property. Power is the aim of all
13 Supra, 21.
14 Supra, 51.
15 Supra, 88.
I s Supra, 65. Haney (EET, 139-40) says that the characteristic
philosophy of Mercantilism was materialistic and based on
self-interest
.

human industry, and while Berkeley demands that private in-
dustry should be in concert with the design of the state,
the good of the state is insured by encouraging private in-
dustry. Bor Berkeley, self-interest, whether in a material-
istic or idealistic sense, was always the real basis of human
activity. Though his essay on Moral Attraction with its
17
emphasis on charity would seem to belie this, he was too
realistic to have any practical theory on the more mellow as-
18
pects of human nature. ill practical projects must recog-
nize man’s selfishness and exploit it.
(3) Laws: Bor Berkeley man as an individual is sub-
servient to the whole of society. But man is essentially
selfish. Since he is by nature social and is nothing apart
from society, his subservience and his selfishness must be
l*7 In this essay Berkeley points to the analogy between the
mutual attraction of all natural bodies in the universe
and man’s social appetites, his charity and benevolence
toward his fellows. ’’And as the attractive power in
bodies is the most universal principle which produceth
innumerable effects, and is a key to explain the various
phenomena of nature; so the corresponding social appetite
in human souls is the great spring and source of moral
action.” >703, IV, 188. Barnes and Becker note the sig-
nificance of this application of physical science to
social life. ST1S, I, 386-59. It seems to have been the
first interpretation of this sort. This had no bearing
on Berkeley’s practical thought. He attributes the
existence of this '’attractive force” to divine action
and finds in it a further proof of God’s benevolence.
All of his ethical theory grows out of the principle of
self interest.
I 0 7GB, IV, 109.
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reconciled by lav;. Lav; and civil authority are the bond and
lq
cement of society. Man's moral duties and obligations are
defined by law. Moral values are established by lav;, either
20formally and abstractly as in Passive Obedience, or by a
p-i
reasonable faith as in the Alciphron.
Political law is the essence of government. The indi-
vidual owes an absolute overt adherence to the civil const i-
22
tut ion.’"'" The state superintends all economic activity,
pc?
comprehending it within a wise plan or system of laws.'' All
changes in the civil constitution are to be brought about
legally, i.e. by those whose position in the organization of
24
the state entitles them to this power.
The concept of established law as the basis of social
control runs throughout Berkeley's thought. Society consists
of individuals whose conflicting interests are mediated by
law, either divinely or humanly established.
(4) Religion: Religion is for Berkeley a necessary in-
gradient of the social process. Only religion, with its sys-
tem of future rewards and punishments, can make moral laws
25
effective. The national religion makes obedience to the
I® Supra, 57.
2° Supra, 43.
H Supra, 52.
WGB, IV, 490 n.
S3 supra, 78.
^ Supra, 6l.
25 supra, 51.
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state a moral obligation. Without this support no government
26
can endure, or retain the obedience of its members. J Slavery
is made effectual by religion. Civilization was to be fur-
27thered, as well as English commerce, by the Bermuda project,"
Religion makes economic industry obligatory; sloth is complete
9 o
ly unbecoming to a Christian,"
(5) Bdueat ion and Reason : Berkeley has an implicit faith
in education and an even greater faith in reason. But he was
realistic enough to realize that few could be expected to be-
come so learned and so wise that no social control, religious
or civil, would be necessary. Truth he considers to be the
"game” of only a few. Hence education for the masses must
take the form of instilling sound prejudices concerning the
29
constitution of the state and its religion." Reason, he
says, should be the rule of all things in the state; when the
members do not think for themselves, the public should think
30
for them. Only a firm faith in the laws of the state and
its religious principles will assure the well-being of society.
This faith can be gained only by education.
Berkeley’s trust in reason and education is at its high-
est point in his views on legislation. The rulers of the
26 Suora, 60.
27 WG-B
,
IV, 356 ff.
28 Ibid., 545-6.
29 Supra, 68.
30 WGB, IV, 426.
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state must above all be wise men. They must be fortified by
knowledge and reason if the functions of the political organ-
ization are to be effective. The chief point in Berkeley’s
political theory is: educate the governors. He would allow
more rational freedom in the education of the superior people,
for those who are capable should follow the light of truth
31to a natural religion.
Despite the disparity in methods the educational prin-
ciple remains intact. Berkeley is certain that better prin-
ciples of social action and control can be taught. Education
and religion are better guards against tyranny than rebellion.
(6) Existing Institutions: An unmistakable element of
Berkeley’s social thought is his faith in existing social in-
stitutions. This is most obvious, of course, in his polemics
in behalf of the Church of England. The national church had
for him a necessary relation to the government. This relation
must be maintained and can be done so only by upholding the
32
constitutional status of the Church.' " He defended the just
33
and legal liberty of the English Constitution. Government
support and religious control of the higher institutions of
34learning must be maintained. The authority of the church
31 Supra, 54.
32 Supra, 53.
33 Supra, 53.
34 Supra, 8.9-
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35in moral matters was not to be questioned.'
In society Berkeley's implication is that social classes
will continue to exist. Hence class relations and conflicts
36
should be recognized and utilized. Foreign trade should be
37
carried on by mercantilist principles.
Existing institutions, then, must be maintained. They
represent the best means to the ends of mankind. All change
should arise from within the institutions not from without by
.
38
popular pressure.
(7) The Public G-ood : In Passive Obedience Berkeley's
conception of the goal of man was purely formalistic—con-
39formity to God's will. Formalism is relinquished in his
later thought in favor of the utilitarian principle. The wel-
40
fare of mankind is the test of moral truth. This criterion
is the basis on which he judges all institutions. The sub-
servience of the individual to society is necessary for the
general happiness. The state is necessary to effect this
subservience. Religion is justified by its necessary relation
to government and as a contributor in itself to public wel-
41fare. Private industry is necessary to support the economic
35 Supra, 69.
35 Supra, 85.
2? Supra, 81.
5
8 Supra, 60.
Supra, 44.
40 Supra, 50.
44 Supra, 53
•
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well-being of society.^2
In making the utilitarian principle and the practical
reason paramount in his social thought, Berkeley does not be-
come a thorough-going utilitarian, however. The public well-
being in any sense, he holds, presupposes social organization
and law. Utility is secured only by la?/. Kis application of
the utilitarian principle takes the form: Which institutions
or laws most effectively secure the public happiness? Pure
43
utilitarianism spelled only chaos.
(8) Summary and Criticism : The foregoing principles may
be accepted as constituting Berkeley's social philosophy.
The members of society are free, selfish, and educable agents.
The possibility of their happiness lies in their subservience
to the whole. This subservience is to be effected by law and
is best brought about by education and religion. These fun-
ctions are best carried out by the existing institutions of
Church and State. All change in the social structure and its
instruments is to be made, if necessary, by the reason of
those in power. The end of society is the greatest happiness
of the whole, which properly includes the happiness of each
individual, with the presuppos ition that law is forever neces-
sary.
42 Supra, 78.
43 Supra, 51.
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One major defect mars the internal consistency of Berk-
eley’s social philosophy. It lies in his conception of edu-
cation in relation to the rulers of society. Han is essen-
tially selfish, Berkeley maintains. By education the masses
can be brought to accept and support the laws of society and
the authroity -which directs them. This acquiescence is gained
through indoctrination, the impressing of established prin-
ciples on the minds of the people. The rulers of society are
subordinate to these same principles. But also, theirs is
the power to modify these principles. All modification must
be directed toward the public good. But human nature is
fundamentally selfish. How is Berkeley to be certain that
the rulers will not subvert the public good to their own
private interest? Quis custodiet jpsos oust odes ?
Berkeley’s rulers are of course limited by legal con-
stitutions. But they have the power to change these. Their
only real limitations are God and truth. Berkeley’s faith in
education and reason led him to believe that if properly pre-
pared the rulers could do nothing antithetical to the best
interests of their subjects. Hence education serves two
functions. It is a restraining influence on the common peo-
ple; it is both a restraint and a guide to positive action
for the rulers. His theory of rule is based on the assumption
that those in power are superior in intellect and that un-
limited education will bring them to transcend their selfish
-.
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interests. There is in his system no positive check on author-
ity and no explicit recognition of the reciprocal relations
between the rulers and the ruled, which alone would make his
theory of education consistent with his view of human nature.
4
*
B. The Adequacy of Berkeley’s Social Philosophy
(1) The Status of the Individual : While Berkeley's lack
of respect for individuals, particularly commoners, may have
been justified in his time, he is to be faulted for not pro-
posing any means of bettering them. The ignorance of the
peasantry in Ireland certainly did not justify allowing them
any voice in the government. If their condition was to be im-
proved, it would have to come from above. A wise government
would be the first necessity. But Berkeley would apparently
have never permitted the people to express their own opinions.
He was too prone to identify ignorance with lack of ability.
Further, he tended to regard the needs of the common people
as largely material. The scarcity of material comforts was
certainly the dominant feature of the peasantry, but it was
far from the only one. Religion was to be provided for their
spiritual needs. Religion for men of intelligence was justi-
fied by reason and required a rational faith. Implicit faith
was to be expected from the masses. Berkeley demanded the
education of the gentry but did not commit himself to any
program of enlightenment for the common people. The most crying
*.
,
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necessity of his time was the need for intelligent government,
but the ignorance of the peasantry was a more fundamental prob-
lem. The Bermuda project may to some extent indicate a desire
on Berkeley’s part to improve the illiterate, but its primary
motive was religious.
Berkeley did extend religious values to all ranks, but
some persons were to be reasoned with and the majority preached
to. Economic values were secured for all, and all men were to
be equal under the law. Aside from these points Berkeley’s
concern for the individual is rather cursory. His ’’Society of
Persons” seems to be one in which most of the people are fol-
lowers who work hard, are well-fed and clothed, who look to
God for their eternal interests, and who have faith in their
leaders for the remainder of their temporal interests.
(2) Self - interest : Berkeley’s emphasis on self-interest
in his practical philosophy seems quite justified. Self-in-
terest is a factor in human nature which must be recognized.
But it is not the only factor, and it is doubtful if it will
bear the weight Berkeley puts on it.
In his ethical theory, self-interest in the guise of
future rewards and punishments looms large. Virtue is not its
43
own reward, or at best is an insufficient reward. Virtuous
action, for Berkeley, requires a deeper motivation, and this
43 Supra, 51
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he finds in the reli 'ious assurance of a future state. Berk-
eley feels that religion, "oy extending man’s selfishness to
an interest in his future life, will make him a better social
unit. Berkeley could not, or at least did not, develop the
factor of self-interest in the social scene to the extent that
Hobbes did. He does not recognize that the individual's true
interest is furthered by social benevolence. The tendency of
this interpretation to support the social contract theory of
the state may have been Berkeley's reason for avoiding it.
Logically, he should have.
The factor of self-interest led Berkeley to place a major
emphasis on the security of private property in his economic
44theory. Private industry is motivated by the desire for
power in a secure form of property. The fact that this leads
to competition forced him to speak of a planned rational econ-
omy. But he fails to point out how conflicting economic in-
terests can be reconciled.
Self-interest on a national scale led Berkeley to propose
self-sufficiency for Ireland and a mercantilist theory of for-
eign trade. He never considers the pernicious effects of
nationalism in commerce. While internationalism was unheard
of in his day, the form of closed state which Berkeley proposes
is even more medieval than it is mercantilist. Such a proposal
44 Supra, 75
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shows that Berkeley was rather short-sighted in economics.
This short-sightedness arises from the self-interest theory.
Nations are dependent on each other even as individuals are.
The best interests of a nation can he served only by coopera-
tive effort and mutual interaction with other nations.
(3) law : That Berkeley was right in affirming the neces-
sity of law is obvious. Only legal liberty is really liberty.
In pointing to the public welfare as the end of law he uncovers
another truth. Law arises from public necessity. The test of
law is whether it meets that necessity. Berkeley’s theory
that law should only be changed by wise legislation demands
consideration. The ignorance of the general public in Berk-
eley's time undoubtedly justified this theory. In denying the
general public's right to raise objections to law Berkeley is
laying the cornerstone of a dictatorship. Wise legislators
responsible only to God and their own logic are apt to lose
sight of the public's true interest. In denying the right of
men to voice their private consciences Berkeley closes the
only rational channel of controlling or influencing legislators,
making rebellion, which he abhorred, the only alternative.
(4) Religion : The central position of religion in Berk-
eley's thought seems somewhat at odds with the utility he
claims for it as a social instrument. It seems hard to believe
that a sincere religious idealist would advocate religion on
,,
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purely utilitarian grounds. That he does so at many times
cannot be denied. One of Berkeley’s chief arguments for the
L
Bermuda project was that it would further colonial enterprises.'
He argues for the baptism of slaves on the grounds that it
would make them better workers I But these statements may be
partially explained by their appearance in literature designed
to gain popular support for an enterprise which grew out of
purely idealistic motives. Berkeley does not hesitate to use
practical arguments as propaganda. But a discussion of the
purity of Berkeley’s religious idealism is not particularly
profitable here. It is evident that religion was for him a
very effective social instrument. The problem here is whether
it is worth the reliance he puts in it.
It is obvious, considering the ignorance of the common
people, that in Berkeley’s time the ”fear of God” was a much
stronger motive to good action than it may have been in a much
more enlightened period. All sorts of supe rstit ions thrive
upon ignorance as well as religious fears. Berkeley does not
propose to base the public welfare on mere superstition, but
in an implicit faith in religious principles and institutions
as established by the councils of the wise. In the face of
ignorance he proposes the most feasible solution. As a stop-
gap, religious faith may curb the passions of the populace and
45 Supra, 18.
45 Supra, 90.
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direct the masses to good works. But doubters arise and reason
penetrates to the lower ranks of society. Berkeley provides
a valuable tool in religious fear, but he does little to dis-
pell the ignorance which makes it usable. If religion is to
continue as an efficient social factor, the masses must be
educated and the prerogatives of a reasonable faith extended
to them.
As a moral motivation the idea of a future state does not
47
warrant the weight Berkeley gives it. Visions of purgatory
do not deter any hungry man from theft. Temporal welfare is
much more attractive than infinite bliss. In urging men to
think more of their eternal interests, Berkeley leaves him-
self open to the Marxist " opium of the people" criticism of
religion. Moral principles must derive their authority from
their social effectiveness not from their assurances of eternal
reward or punishments. How this does not imply that morals
are divorced from the basic reality. Berkeley is justified
in holding that such values as moral goodness and beauty must
be attributed to an active and reasonable principle supreme in
48the universe. But their true value is intrinsic and imme-
diate and does not derive from transcendent hope or fears.
Berkeley's argument that religion has been a chief support
of civilization is just. The cultural influence of the church
Supra, 51
48 Supra, 51
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through its support of education cannot be denied. The
national religion which he supports has, however, been of du-
50bious value in other respects. Too close a relation between
religion and politics is never healthy. Religious principles
must be embodied in government. Thus far, Berkeley can be
agreed with. But national establishment of religion intro-
duces political venality into a sphere which cannot endure
such influence without destroying the faith of its adherents.
51
Berkeley’s conception of a "national conscience" is a mean-
ingless abstraction, but it fits in well with his economic
nationalism. The national "power" certainly needs to be sup-
plemented by a national conscience.
(5) Sducat ion and ieason : Berkeley’s major emphases on
education and reason are the most valuable aspects of his soc-
ial philosophy. The use he makes of education cannot be fully
endorsed, however. The essence of education is that it should
be free and reasonable. Berkeley’s system of education for
the great mass of people was neither. He would indoctrinate
the populace with a body of principles decided by the rulers.
By rational argument where possible, by exhortation and demands
of faith where reason failed, the people were to be given a set
49 Supra, 52.
Supra, 53.
51 WGB
,
IV, 498.
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of principles which embodied the truths of revealed religion,
the basic moral virtues, the fundamentals of the civil con-
52
stitution as interpreted by those in power.
The only criticism to be made of Berkeley’s theory that
reason should be the rule in all things is that he did not ex-
tend it far enough. His lack of respect for the bulk of
mankind led him to restrict the prerogative of reason to those
in power. It is true that only a few ever attain truth or
have sufficient insight to direct mankind according to its
best interests. But it is also true that no harmonious society
can ever exist in a nation where one's private conscience may
not be rationally expressed.
(6) Existing Institutions : What attitude should be taken
toward existing institutions? This is a basic problem of
social philosophy. Should present institutions be discarded
and new instruments be supplied? Or should existing institu-
tions be preserved but criticized and modified to more ade-
quately meet the present needs?
Berkeley's view is obviously the latter qualified by a
firm belief that the present forms were adequate and that any
change, if necessary, should be made from within, by those in
power. The only change recommended was the improvement of
the rulers through education. This improvement he demanded
52 Supra, 68
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emphatically. He did propose an extension of function is
his scheme for a National Bank. The currency reforms he pro-
posed required only an improved use of existing functions.
The institutions he hopes to preserve are: (1) The Eng-
lish government and the constitution by which it is supported;
(2) the church of England with its intimate relation to the
civil constitution of which it is a chief cornerstone. Ex-
tending the concept TT institution" one finds Berkeley support-
ing: (3) the public universities, government-supported and
church-controlled; (4) the class system (He makes no move to
remove class-qualifications and balance classes against each
other in his economic theory.); (5) private property: (6) and,
the mercantilist conception of national economy and foreign
trade
•
The first and last institutions noted above have suf-
fered changes in succeeding years which refute Berkeley's
opinion of them. The English government has become steadily
more democratic. Mercantilism has been dead for two hundred
years though nationalism still lingers.
Though Berkeley's conservative tendency to cling to ex-
isting institutions is not in itself a fault, his refusal to
permit external criticism cannot be condoned. His view of
society and its control is essentially static. The empirical
facts of social change demand a more liberal view.
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(7) The Public Good: This conception requires only a
word. Berkeley’s insight into the necessary relation of human
happiness and law is essentially sound. He does not live up
to his own view, however, in failing to recognize many of the
values which are necessary to human happiness. The intellectual
values were apparently not for the masses. He does not recog-
nize the reciprocal relations of individuals in society and
the values resulting from them as such.
(8) Summary: Perhaps the most obvious criticism which
can be made of Berkeley's social philosophy is that of inade-
quacy. It is inadequate in that many problems are unnoticed,
in that it lacks insight in many cases, and that no adequate
provision is made for change and growth. This criticism must
be qualified, however, for Berkeley never intends to expound
a full, systematic social philosophy. The materials from
which his social philosophy must largely be gleaned are of the
nature of practical suggestions on particular problems. The
plea of human frailty suffices for the second criticism. The
third must be moderated by the fact that Berkeley’s social-
philosophical writings are to a great extent polemical in char-
acter. He defends the Church and, to a lesser degree, the
state against the free-thinkers who, he thought, would destroy
them. To find Berkeley's social philosophy this polemical
veil must be penetrated, though the existence and the direction
of this polemic are valuable clues in themselves.
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First of all should he noted a lack of respect for intel-
ligence and for the efficacy of reason in the masses, coupled
with too much faith in the intelligence and reason of the rulers
Second, Berkeley tends to subordinate the individual to
the social whole and put him at the disposal of those in power.
Third, Berkeley proposes to gain this subordination by
methods destructive to the dignity of human nature— indoctri-
nation and religious fear.
Fourth, he over-emphasizes self-interest as an attribute
of human nature. This mistake arises from a psychological
atomism which Berkeley strove unsuccessfully to transcend.
Fifth, basing his ethics on self-interest, transmuted in
religion to eternal self-interest, he fails to arrive at an
effective guide to morality.
Sixth, his faith in existing institutions and in the po-
tential intelligence and benevolence of those controlling them
led Berkeley to make no adequate provision for social change.
But on the positive side of the ledger must be noted:
First, Berkeley recognizes the necessary relations of
human freedom, happiness, and law.
Second, he emphasizes education, though limiting it, as
the basic method in social action and control.
Third, Berkeley recognizes the general welfare of mankind
as the supreme standard of morality.
Fourth, he recognizes the need for religion and would ex-
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tend Christianity to all, regardless of race or condition.
Fifth, he emphasizes the need of wise men in government.
And sixth, Berkeley demands that reason he made the rule
of all things and that truth, even in religion, he recognized
as the highest aim.
Berkeley’s social philosophy is, on the whole, a consis-
tent development of certain well-defined principles. He recog-
nizes the empirical facts of human ignorance and limitation.
Rational methods are for him the best in coping with social
problems. Though inadequate in many respects, his social
philosophy indicates a deep and fairly acute interest in soc-
ial problems. As a whole his social philosophy contributes
little to present issues. Conservatism is too prone to remem-
ber past glories and overlook present evils. But in demanding
wisdom and reason in practical affairs Berkeley has indicated
the timeless condition of the good society.
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SUMMARY
Three considerations justify a study of Berkeley's social
philosophy: his personal and public life, the social implica-
tions of his epistemology and metaphysics, and his writings
on numerous social matters. A survey of his life reveals a
deep interest in social problems. His life is characterized
by a firm stand against the free-thinking which he considered
so dangerous to religion, morals, and politics. A positive
social interest is attested by his Bermuda project and his
panacea for all human ills in the 3 iris . Berkeley’s theistic
metaphysics and epistemology provide an adequate theoretical
basis for social theory, but he fails to work it out coher-
ently. The significance of the individual is recognized but
never justified. Berkeley fails to exploit the rational self-
activity of the concrete self. Though his social writings
are chiefly polemic and propaganda, certain well-defined prin-
ciples are found consistently throughout.
The antinomy of the self passive in knowing but active in
willing is never transcended by Berkeley. The significant
unity of the self is assumed despite its unknowab ility by
empirical logic. This leads to a denial of real human free-
dom and intelligence in his early thought. The situation is
to a degree remedied later by a more concrete logic. The
Lockean epistemology gives way to notional ideas and a recog-
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nition of the necessity of faith. This is apparent in Berk-
eley's moral theory. The absolute and negative formalism of
his early moral theory gives way to a system requiring faith
and the practical reason. By this change actual freedom is
secured since the acceptance of moral responsibility as dic-
tated by religion is an act of personal faith.
For Berkeley the chief basis of social authority is neces-
sity. He recognizes implicitly the political sovereignty of
the people but mistrusts it. The existence of a certain poli-
tical organization, the weight of tradition, and consonance
with established religious truths are for him the principal
bases of political authority.
The greatest need in political organization is not a
modification of structure or function but the improvement of
the authorities or rulers. This improvement is to be effected
by education and the inculcation of religious truths.
The functions of political authority are the maintaining
of the peace, order, and well-being of the citizen. This is
accomplished by law bolstered by religion. Religion makes
obedience to law a moral obligation without which no effective
civil organization can be maintained.
The method par excellence for supporting the government
is education. For the great masses of people this must be in-
doctrination. The principles of government and religion and
the moral virtues must be formulated by wise rulers. This
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ideology is to be impressed upon the people.
The status of citizens for Berkeley is one of industrious
material activity and passive faith in intellectual and spiri-
tual matters. The people as such has no direct voice in poli-
tical matters. Government gives them the necessary spur to
industry hy securing private property and equality under the
law.
Wealth for Berkeley is the power to command industry and
raw materials. On the national scale wealth is combined in-
dustry of the citizens directed toward the power of the whole
state. Berkeley recognizes the extrinsic character of money
and urges that circulation be stimulated through a more ade-
quate currency. The industry of the individual is the economic
unit. In the nation Berkeley’s wish is a sort of a planned
economy. This planning, however, is not to eliminate competi-
tion but only to direct industry into more profitable and ad-
vantageous channels. Berkeley considers indolence the real
cause of poverty and fails to recognize other factors such as
unemployment and restrictions put upon the Irish Catholic
peasantry.
Berkeley is an economic nationalist of the medieval type.
He argues for self-sufficiency in nations. Though seeing the
fallacy of the purely monetary balance of trade theory, he re-
tains the fundamentals of the mercantilist theory, foreign
trade is to be carried on, if necessary, in such a way that
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the national power is increased.
Berkeley apparently retains the class-system. He makes
no move to remove class-qualifications in the civil government.
He balances them against each other in his economic and cul-
tural theory. Conspicuous consumption and class emulation
are to be exploited. They offer the best means of inciting
the lower classes to industry and to intellectual development.
Education is, according to Berkeley, an end in itself to
those most capable. For the mass of people it is the primary
method for gaining adherence to established institutions.
Berkeley offers no expansion of free education beyond the mem-
bers of the gentry. Similarly for religion, reasonable faith
can be expected of only a few. For the masses implicit faith
and the fear of God suffice. Religion is a chief support of
all human action. It is an instrument without which morality,
civil harmony, education, and industry cannot thrive.
Berkeley views individuals as free, selfish, educable,
and for the most part inferior. Their true interest can be
gained only by reconciling their self-interests through la?/
and existing institutions administered by wise rulers. Reason
for the rulers, indoctrination for the masses—that is the
modus operand! of the good community. All change must be
reasonable and effected from within or above existing institu-
tions. The happiness of the whole is the ultimate moral and
social criterion
'_
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Berkeley's social philosophy is at best inadequate. His
conception of the goal of society is correct, but the means he
proposes are inadequate. His faith in education and reason
are justified, but to be successful these means must be avail-
able for all. In placing the rulers and their principles be-
yond the reach of the masses Berkeley has made rebellion the
only possible means of insuring social change.
,-
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